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Abstract 
In this paper we compare the Hartz reforms in Germany with three other major labor market activation 
reforms  carried  out  by  center-left  governments.    Two  of  the  cases,  Britain  and  Germany,  involved 
radically  neoliberal  “mandatory”  activation  policies,  whereas  in  the  Netherlands  and  Ireland  radical 
activation change took a very different “enabling” form.  Two of the cases, Ireland and Germany, were 
path deviant, Britain and the Netherlands were path dependent.  We explain why Germany underwent 
“mandatory” and path deviant activation by focusing on two features of the policy discourse.  First, the 
coordinative (or elite level) discourse was “ensilaged” sealing policy formation off from dissenting actors 
and, until belatedly unwrapped for enactment, from the wider communicative (legitimating) discourse.  
This is what the British and German cases had in common and the result was reform that viewed long term 
unemployment as personal failure rather than market failure.  Second, although the German policy-making 
system lacked the “authoritative” features that facilitated reform in the British case, and the Irish policy-
making  system  lacked  the  “reflexive”  mechanisms  that  facilitated  reform  in  the  Dutch  case,  in  both 
Germany and Ireland the communicative discourses were reshaped by novel institutional vehicles (the 
Hartz Commission in the German case, FÁS in the Irish case) that served to fundamentally alter system-
constitutive  perceptions  about  policy.    In  the  Irish  and  German  cases  “government  by  commission” 
created a realignment of advocacy coalitions with one coalition acquiring a new, ideologically-dominant 
and path deviating narrative.  The findings suggest that major reform of labor market and welfare state 
policy may be much more malleable than previously thought. 
I Introduction 
The literatures on welfare state and labor market reform in advanced capitalist democracies tend to stress 
the  stickiness  of  existing  systems,  the  difficulty  of  accomplishing  significant  retrenchment  and  the 
tendency to reform freezing and immobilism.  Where change occurs it is argued that it is likely to be both 
incremental and path dependent.  A batch of non-incremental “activation” reforms targeting long term 
unemployment in recent years have struck most observers as puzzling, if not miraculous, suggests that 
social and labor market reform in Europe may be much more malleable than previously thought.  In this 
paper we examine four cases of non-incremental activation reform carried out by centre-left governments.  
Two of these were broadly path dependent (the Netherlands and Britain), two path deviant (Ireland and 
Germany).  It is shown that although the Irish political economy strongly resembles the British in most 
regards  (a  liberal  welfare  state  tradition,  a  liberal  market  economy,  a  strongly  centralized  state),  the 
discourse on labor market and social policy was structured after 1987, and in particular 1992-7, so as to 
mimic the “reflexive” pattern typical of Scandinavian and Dutch cases, yielding an “enabling” form of 
activation that has been remarkably robust, even when the Irish political economy reverted to type after 
2000
1.  It is then shown that although the German political economy strongly resembles the Dutch (a 
Bismarckian welfare state tradition, a coordinated market economy, with deep corporatism), the policy 
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in Britain, yielding a “mandatory” form of activation, that has been institutionalized even as the German 
political economy has reverted to type since 2005.   
Two major arguments are made in this paper.  First, the policy reform discourse may be structured in 
such a way as to override the “normal” pattern of policy-making.  Where there is an open process of 
reflexive  “deliberative  governance”,  with  a  pragmatic  attempt  at  shared  understanding  and  policy 
formation and legitimation essentially coterminous, the construction of an advocacy coalition to bring the 
reform effort to success precludes a centre-left government (and perhaps others) enacting a “mandatory 
activation” policy.  A problem solving logic applies and a broad range of actors engage in a joint search 
for solutions.  This applied in the Irish and Dutch cases.  In Germany and Britain a government-privileged 
advocacy coalition succeeded in inducing a much more stringent policy outcome than might otherwise 
have been predicted.  Here the coordinating discourse was initially “ensilaged”.  As this sealed discourse 
moved sequentially toward a wider communicative policy discourse, and legitimation, what mattered were 
authoritative  mechanisms to  by-pass  vetoes  and  win  passive  assent.    Second,  path  deviant reform  in 
Germany and Ireland occurred because novel institutional vehicles (the Hartz Commission and FÁS) 
broke the existing moulds for policy change. 
II Research Design, Forms of Analysis and Organization of the Paper 
The analytic framework used in this paper is laid out in part III.  First, a typology for understanding 
activation policy which draws on “competition state” theory, is set out.  A crucial paradigmatic difference 
between “mandatory activation” and “enabling activation” is identified concerning whether the primary 
onus is on the individual benefit recipient to behaviorally demonstrate a desire to work or on public 
authorities to provide the support that will allow a person to work.  The “mandatory” paradigm holds that 
the  long  term  unemployed  are  engaged  in anti-social  behavior,  their  unemployment  is  voluntary  and 
sanctions need to be used to correct this.  “Enabling” activation focuses only on making the inactive 
employable, not on curbing anti-social behavior.   
Different theoretical approaches to explaining policy change are discussed in part III.2.  Approaches 
identifying economic determinism and institutional determinism are outlined, then approaches focusing on 
party competition, policy learning, and discourse.  We settle on the advocacy coalition framework, which 
captures the best of these other explanatory approaches.  Within this framework we use discourse analysis 
(of both coordinative and communicative discourse) as the principal method, indicating why discourse 
analysis might be the most appropriate way of applying the advocacy coalition framework.  
The four cases reflect different outcomes regarding (a) the type of activation accomplished and (b) 
path dependency (see Fig. 1).  The puzzle which triggered this paper was why a red-green government in a 
Bismarckian coordinated market economy implemented a mandatory activation (“neoliberalism in one Boyle/Schünemann  The Malleable Politics of Activation Reform  April 2009 
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class” for the unemployed) whilst in neoliberal Ireland a competition state overtly repudiated mandatory 
benefit conditionality in favor of an “enabling” regime.. 
Fig. 1. Activation Reform and Path Dependency: case selection. 
  Path Dependent  Path Deviant 
Enabling Activation Reform  Netherlands  Ireland 
Mandatory Activation Reform  Britain  Germany 
 
In the empirical sections of the paper we first analyze the Dutch and British cases.  Not only have 
these cases been influential examples within Europe, the extensive literatures on each have also been 
theoretically influential regarding deliberative governance and the export of the US model to a European 
setting respectively.  Examination of the Dutch case, characterized as “Enabling Activation”, relies on the 
secondary  literature,  particularly  Hemerijck  and  associates
2.    Examination  of  the  British  case, 
characterized as “Mandatory Activation” relies on Boyle (2006) and Boyle and Roy (2006).  The crucial 
reform window in Modell Niederlande is identified as 1992-97, that for Britain’s New Deal as 1997-2000.  
In each of these cases policy change was radical enough to warrant being called “miraculous” by some, 
but they still clearly followed national path dependent trajectories
3.   
Although the Ireland is usually held up as the poster child for radical neo-liberalism, analysis building 
on  Boyle  (2005
4)  demonstrates  that  at  the  Celtic  Tiger’s  core  lay  an  activation  reform  process  that 
combined state-led developmentalism, positive political clientelism
5, and a social democratic policy ethos.  
The crucial activation reform was the Community Employment initiative in the 1992-95 window.  The 
Irish used active labor market programs to create an isolated but enduring “enabling-centered” activation 
strategy characterized as “Activation without Conditionality”.  
Finally, although Germany has been identified as the classical “reform blocked” political economy, 
the Hartz reforms constitute the largest activation reform in Europe yet accomplished, and one that was 
path deviant.  Primary discourse analysis of 45 documents presented here, using discourse theory from 
Foucault  (Foucault  1981),  the  social  constructivist research  program  of  Keller  (Keller  2008) and  the 
framework of Grounded Theory (Strauss 1998) demonstrates that the way in which the Hartz coordinative 
and  communicative  discourses  were  structured  allowed  a  radical  “mandatory-centered”  policy  to  be 
developed and implemented: an outcome characterized as “Neo-liberalism In One Class.” 
The existing literature on Hartz raises two questions: why such a big reform occurred; and why was it 
so radically neo-liberal.  We outline answers to both questions by addressing the specifics of how it 
succeeded.  By “ensilaging” the formative, coordinative discourse and then using government-by-commis-
sion
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Schröder  government  mimicked  both  the  authoritative  policy-making  process  extant  in  Britain  and 
effected a radically neo-liberal outcome: a mandatory activation regime. 
III Analytic Framework: Activation, Advocacy Coalitions and Discourse Analysis 
III.1. Activation: mandatory- and enabling-centered reform.   
Activation policy is paradigmatically distinct from both neo-Keynesian and free market world views.  For 
neo-Keynesians
7  achieving  full  employment  through  aggregate  demand  (fiscal  policy  and  wage 
regulation)  and  a  high  level  of  redistributive  social  policy  –  the  “Keynesian  Welfare  State”  (KWS) 
synthesis - is the core belief.  The initial program of the first Mitterrand government was perhaps the last 
time  this  was  attempted  in  a  large  economy.    For  social  democratic  neo-Keynesians  in  small,  open 
economies “Active Labor Market Policy” (ALMP) was long an important secondary mechanism focused 
on retraining labor from declining sectors for jobs in growing sectors
8.  But it was not the role of the 
“KWS” to reshape people’s labor market participation: the KWS facilitated growth and then put the fiscal 
divided to redistributive purposes, creating social rights in the process.  The distinction between “active” 
labor market policy and “activating” labor market policy is important here.  At the other end of the 
spectrum free market ideas repudiated KWS principles.  In the ordo-liberal variant the state was important 
in forming a proper legal order for the economy, but it was not supposed to direct economic processes.  In 
the “social market economy” formulation the “social” is strictly passive.  “Active” policies were viewed at 
best as mere palliative.   
As Cerny (1995, 2000, 2005) has argued the forces variously known as economic “neo-liberalism” 
and “globalization” have led not to a decline of state intervention but rather to an increase in intervention 
and regulation:  to actively promote competitiveness and marketization (Cerny, 2000:122).  This involves 
microeconomic  intervention  rather  than  macroeconomic  intervention,  responsiveness  to  international 
markets, and a focus on enterprise, innovation and profits rather than social cohesion: the “welfare state” 
metamorphosising into the “competition state”
9.  “The competition state” is a macro-level descriptor for 
the model that has largely displaced the KWS.  At the sub-system level of social and labor market policy 
“activation” is the operational term for “competition state” policy.  Activation has four key characteristics: 
• Embraces strict limits on what states can do
10, 
• Privileges  labor  market  participation  as  over  other  social  activity:  universal  participation  by 
working age people in waged work is the goal.
11 
• Focuses on using social policy to reshape labor market participation in order to promote growth.   
• Views social policy as mutual responsibility between individuals and government, as opposed to 
“rights based”; the fundamental duty of the individual is to do waged work. 
 
All activation policy is in the broadest sense “neo-liberal”.  But activation (and the competition state) 
covers  a  wide  spectrum.    Recent  scholarship  has  done  much  to  outline  and  classify  the  variety  of 
activation dimensions and instruments.  Typologies have been devised by Lodemal and Trickey (2000), Boyle/Schünemann  The Malleable Politics of Activation Reform  April 2009 
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Barbier (2004) and van Berkel and Hornemann Moller (2002), which tend towards updated versions of 
Esping-Andersen’s  (1990)  “three  worlds”  typology.    Other  scholars  classify  instruments,  usually  in 
binaries:  Fleckenstein  (2008)  positive/negative
12    ;  Eichhorst  and  Konle-Seidle 
13  (2008) 
demanding/enabling; Torfing (1999)
14 carrot/stick, and Chancellor Schröder famously Fordern/Fördern.  
We  use  “enabling”/“mandatory”,  building  mainly  on  Eichhorst  and  Konle-Seidle  (2008).    But  more 
important than labeling the instruments is identifying the key paradigmatic distinction which lies at the 
heart of different activation packages. 
Figure 2. Activation Policy Paradigms and Advocacy Coalitions 
 
The crucial difference within the activation world view arises concerning whether the primary onus is 
on the individual recipient to behaviorally demonstrate a desire to work or on public authorities to provide 
the support that will allow a person to work.  Mutuality matters in both cases, but the onus differs.  
“Mandatory”  labor  market  participation  stems  from  a  discourse  that  focuses  on  the  individual 
responsibility  of  the  inactive  and  the  need  to  police  anti-social  behavior.    “Enabling”  labor  market 
participation stems from a discourse that focuses on the state’s need to coax and support the inactive.  The 
assumption made by the “mandatory” paradigm that the long term unemployed are engaged in anti-social 
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behavior, their unemployment is voluntary and sanctions need to be used to correct this
15.  “Enabling” 
activation doesn’t question the willingness to work, it focuses on making the inactive employable. 
All  activation  packages  have  both  mandatory  and  enabling  features.    At  a  minimum,  all  benefit 
programs for the working aged are defended against fraud and thus entail “benefit conditionality”.  Even 
the most coercive “work first” activation (work-welfare in the US) provides certain additional services and 
benefits  to  “clients”.    Not  only  are  the  boundaries between  the  mandatory  and  enabling  versions  of 
activation fluid, there is fluidity between activation paradigms and both neo-Keynesian and free market 
paradigms.  Each of the four paradigms has a distinctive core belief, but advocacy coalitions can combine 
actors with differing first-order ideas where there is overlap with second-order ideas
16 (fig. 2).  
III.2. Explaining Activation Outcomes 
Having thus characterized our dependent variable “activation”, what factors are held to have shaped such 
outcomes?  Convergence and divergence arguments have figured prominently in the literature.  Much of 
the first wave literature on neo-liberalism and globalization suggested an inexorable international policy 
convergence, eroded national autonomy, with governments reduced to a vestigial, dignified role.   Policy 
options  were  viewed  as  being  narrowed  to  a  single,  neo-liberal  path  resituating  the  state  “into  a 
subordinate relationship with global economic forces” (Falk, 1996:15).  Economic determinists argued 
welfare state expansion and contraction was principally related to economic factors (Castles, 1999), or that 
economic  crisis  was  the  cause  of  change  (Huber  and  Stephens,  1999).    Other  political-economists 
maintained that globalization, far from mandating one-size-fits-all neo-liberalism, left social democratic 
alternatives viable (Garrett, 1998).  Comparativists also established that there were distinctive types of 
advanced capitalist economies (Esping Andersen, 1990; King, 1995), and there was particular interest in 
the  question  of  whether  the  “Anglo-American”  world  of  welfare  capitalism  enjoyed  a  comparative 
institutional advantage over other “worlds” (Hall and Soskice 2002).   
However,  among  scholars  undertaking  empirical  work  on  welfare  state  reform  a  predominant 
consensus gradually emerged that welfare states showed great resilience to change of any sort.  In fact, 
many welfare states appeared reform-blocked.  Institutional-determinist arguments such as Pierson (1994 
and 2001) and Boyle (2005b) argued that welfare state retrenchment generated enormous electoral risks 
for government, and even highly motivated governments with strong capacity had to pursue cautious 
strategies to avoid blame.  Others argued that institutional veto players rather than popular legitimation 
problems hindered reform (Bonoli, 2001, Pierson, 1998).  Scholars working on the “Bismarckian” cases 
were especially prone to see “reformstau” via veto players (Streeck and Kitschelt, 2003), especially the 
“joint decision trap” (Scharpf, 1976) in Germany.  Rational choice institutionalism developed arguments 
about how arenas of broad policy consensus effectively give rise to multiple veto-players and a freeze on 
policy innovation (Tsebelis, 2002) or alternatively how the absence of a majority party and a clearly Boyle/Schünemann  The Malleable Politics of Activation Reform  April 2009 
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dominant interest group may facilitate policy innovation (Crepaz, 2001).  The extent to which policy sub-
systems are loosely or tightly “coupled” is particularly important in this regard (Terry, 2003; Peters, 
2001).    Hemerijck  and  Schludi  distinguish  between  loosely  and  tightly  coupled  ideal  types  (2000). 
Loosely coupled welfare states are characterized by a relative lack of coordination between networks and 
adjustment  can  take  place  at  the  sub-system  level.  Tightly  coupled  welfare  states  are  identified  by 
‘decision-making institutions that enable policy makers to coordinate policy interdependencies’ leading to 
‘coordinated  change  and  issue  linkage  across  different  policy  areas  (136-7).  The  capacity  for  policy 
innovation, and for consolidating innovation, was also argued to be shaped by the pattern of portfolio 
allocation within coalitions (Laver and Shepsle, 1996) and the pattern of fiscal governance (Hallerberg, 
2004).  Boyle characterizes policy making institutions in Ireland as loosely coupled in that ‘there is often 
considerable  capacity  for  autonomous  intervention,  but  little  capacity  for  joined-up  government  and 
coordination  of  policy  across  sub-systems’  with  the  ‘partial  exception’  of  the  ‘centralized  financial 
authority exercised by the Department of Finance’ (2005: 20).  
Although “divergence” or “freezing” hypotheses are predominant in the field of welfare state reform, 
one important convergence argument that has recently revived concerns the EU, particularly through the 
Lisbon agenda.  In the era of the “semi-sovereign welfare state” (Hemerijck, 2006; Leibfried/Pierson 
1997), the role of international actors cannot be ignored.  Hartz is the first major reform examined here to 
be enacted after Lisbon.  Eichhorst and Hemerijck’s (2008) analysis suggests that the EU’s 1997 European 
Employment Strategy can be seen as an international manifestation of the “enabling” paradigm, with the 
1994 OECD Jobs Strategy as the equivalent for the “mandatory” paradigm.  In the same time period what 
were to become the New Member States of the EU in 2004 were under heavy influence from the World 
Bank  and  the  IMF,  whose  policy  advice  comprised  an  ordo-liberal  alternative  beyond  the  activation 
paradigm.  The argument has been made that these international factors may be leading to a “contingent 
convergence” (Eichorst and Konle-Seidl, 2008) 
Institutionalists have been accused by some of underestimating the role of political parties.  Pederson 
(2001)  argues  that  the  difference  between  a  left-right,  two-block  party  system  and a  left-center-right 
“pivot” party system is crucial.  The role that center-left parties play in reform episodes is especially 
interesting: the “Nixon to China” thesis suggesting that as center-left parties “own” the welfare state issue 
(Ross 2000), only they can reform it.  Kitschelt (2001) and Camerra-Rowe (2004) have focused on the 
circumstances in which the leadership of a left-wing party will pursue a policy opposed by large parts of 
the party and the support-base.  They argue that strategic electoral calculations can lead a party leader to 
ignore internal opposition and pursue new electoral constituencies.  Where the reform process is more 
“declarative” (or Machiavellian) the construction of an advocacy coalition to carry forward the reform is 
subject to the logic of heresthetics (Riker, 1986) and strategic calculation replaces open-ended search.  
Reforms  are  “parachuted”  into  place  and  opponents  were  manipulated  into  assent  or  marginalized.  Boyle/Schünemann  The Malleable Politics of Activation Reform  April 2009 
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Strategic manipulation, the heresthetics of policy change, involves the manipulation of the framing of 
issues  by  political  leaders  in  order to  deconstruct  alternative coalitions  and  construct  a new  winning 
coalition, is particularly important here.   
This last point illustrates that much of the most important “politics” of welfare state or activation 
reform  is  intra-party  rather  than  inter-party.    This  highlights  a  larger  problem  with  institutionalist 
arguments: they tend to focus on the interest-based position of institutional actors rather than the more 
fluid pattern of alliances that often tend to cross-cut these institutions.  Fluidity is a central theme in 
analysis  of  welfare  state  reform  that  focuses  on  policy  learning,  the  role  of  policy  expertise  and 
“puzzling”.    At  the  same  time  that  globalization  gives  rise  to  an  intensification  of  certain  sorts  of 
intervention it also increases the level of uncertainty about the course of action that needs to be followed 
(Hemerijck and Schludi 2000): competitiveness in an uncertain international environment requires states 
and other policy actors to engage in more “puzzling” and less “powering”
17.  Hemerijck looks at the 
reconfiguration/recalibration  of  policy  profiles,  viewing  this  as  a  “system-wide  search  for  a  new, 
economically  viable,  politically  feasible,  and  socially  acceptable  profile  of  social  and  economic 
regulation” (2001:127).  There is a sequential logic of [effective] policy adjustment, understood as a 
dynamic political process of problem-induced policy learning.  Learning is important, as is the role of 
boundary-spanning institutions which structure the policy discourse by shaping the perceptions of actors 
with regard to what is desirable and feasible.  The role of “expert” advice is important in this regard.  
Eichorst and Winterman (2006) analyze the array of institutions that provide policy “intelligence” of 
various  sorts:  academic,  government,  private,  social  partner,  and  other  institutes  generate  data, 
recommendations  and  political  analysis.    How  these  institutes  are  structured  is  crucial:  are  some 
privileged? Do they forge a consensus or are they adversarial?  Eichorst and Winterman argue that in 
some settings expert discourse at both elite and public levels are more pragmatic and “sincere”, in others 
they are more strategic or Machiavellian: states vary in the extent to which the “structure of policy advice 
…can generate conceptual convergence, pragmatic compromise and legitimation of reforms” (2006: 278). 
Different schools of thought reference “discourse” and many scholars engage in “intuitive discourse 
analysis”, but more formal discourse analysis has been less common in this field.  Schmidt (2002) used 
discourse analysis to examine welfare state reform, distinguishing between the “coordinative discourse” 
through which elite-level actors talk to one another, and may arrive at a consensus about a policy program, 
and a “communicative discourse” through which these actors then engage the public through cognitive 
and normative arguments (2002: 171-2).  In “single actor” systems, with an authoritative executive center, 
coordinative discourses are “thin” and directed at the executive, but communicative discourses are more 
important as there is a greater task in generating legitimacy for an “ensilaged”
18 reform proposal.  The 
wider  discourse  can  be  highly  adversarial.    In  multi-actor  systems  coordinative  discourse  is  more 
important, and protracted, but once a consensus is established the broader range of elites serve as agents to Boyle/Schünemann  The Malleable Politics of Activation Reform  April 2009 
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secure the legitimation of their respective constituencies, including where sacrifice from the constituency 
is  required  (Schmidt,  2002,  172-3).   The  “formation”  and  “legitimation”  discourses  are coterminous.  
Analysis  of  social  pacts  and  “deliberative  governance”  (O’Donnell,  2008;  Molina  and  Rhodes  2002, 
Pochet and Fajertag, 2000; Hanke and Rhodes, 2005) in explaining the survival of corporatism in the 
absence of the structural conditions for corporatism, focus on the elite-level discourses that pacting and 
“partnership  states”  promote,  for  our  purposes  what  is  most  important  about  such  pacts  is  that  they 
promote coterminous rather than sequential coordinating and communicative discourses.  
In sum, from the institutionalists we take that “normal” politics is likely to be incremental and path 
dependent, and the need to focus on the role of veto actors.  From the literature on parties we take the need 
to focus on center-left episodes and intra party politics (parties, indeed all institutional actors, are non-
unitary).  From policy learning analysis we take the importance of ideas and the need to focus on how 
policy advice is structured.  From discourse approaches we take the need to consider whether discourse is 
reflexive  (the  coordinative  discourse  coterminous  with  the  communicative  discourse)  or 
authoritative/strategic  (with  an  ensilaged  coordinative  discourse  initially  detached  from  the 
communicative, legitimating discourse).    
The particular approach followed in this paper draws on the advocacy coalition framework developed 
by Sabatier and collaborators (Sabatier 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1988, 1999).  The advocacy 
coalition approach captures the best features of the different literatures outlined above.  The advocacy 
coalition  framework  views  policy  sub-systems  as  central  in  bringing  about  policy  change  and  is 
particularly useful for analysis at the sub-system level. A policy sub-system encompasses a large and 
diverse set of actors that attempt to translate their beliefs about a particular political issue or set of issues 
into governmental policies and programmes.
19  According to Sabatier, most sub-systems contain only a 
few politically significant advocacy groupings, usually ranging from two to four coalitions.  The advocacy 
coalition approach examines „the effects of policy-oriented learning on the broader process of policy 
change by analyzing the manner in which elites from different advocacy coalitions gradually alter their 
belief systems over time, partially as a result of formal policy analyses and trial and error learning.” 
(Sabatier 1988: 130).  Within the subsystem, it is assumed that actors can be aggregated into a number of 
advocacy coalitions composed of people from various organizations who share a set of normative and 
causal beliefs and who often act in concert.” (Sabatier 1988: 133).  Further, “In most subsystems the 
number of politically-significant advocacy coalitions will be quite small. In quiescent subsystems there 
may only be a single coalition.“ (Sabatier 1988: 140) 
The advocacy coalition framework sees the policy process and policy change as involving competing 
coalitions of policy actors within sub-systems mediated by policy brokers.  Within these sub-systems, 
actors’ preferences and stances are not dictated by organizational affiliation: any one organization may 
well be split between rival coalitions.  Coalitions form around different policy core ideas and paradigms.  Boyle/Schünemann  The Malleable Politics of Activation Reform  April 2009 
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Conflicts over policy change generate ‘paradigm politics’.  A notable aspect of the advocacy coalition 
framework is that it was developed, and has been most heavily used, to analyze environmental policy in 
the  US  and  internationally.    A  feature  of  such  policy  is  the  role  of  expertise,  particularly  scientific 
discourse in shaping policy.  This paper will address the role of research-based policymaking in the area 
of activation policy. 
Sabatier  has  proposed  for  empirical  analysis:  “content  analyses  of  government  documents  (e.g. 
legislative and administrative hearings) and interest group publications probably offer the best prospects 
for systematic empirical work on changes in belief systems” (SABATIER 1988: 147). That is what we do 
for the Hartz case in this paper below by applying analysis following Foucault’s discourse theory as well 
as theoretical continuation and methodological practices inspired by the sociology of knowledge and laid 
out recently by Keller (Keller 2008). Following Keller’s research program we also use a methodological 
framework  for  qualitative  social  research,  the  framework  of  Grounded  Theory  (Strauss  1998).    The 
compatibility of this with the advocacy coalition framework is clear:  “Thus the framework explicitly 
rejects  the  view  that  actors  are  primarily  motivated  by  their  short-term  self-interest  and  thus  that 
‘coalitions of convenience’ of highly varying composition will dominate policy-making over time….This 
framework uses belief systems, rather than ‘interests’, as its focus because beliefs are more inclusive and 
more verifiable.” (SABATIER 1988: 141-2).  By adding social constructivist thinking to the institutional 
setting of advocacy coalitions we also can avoid some theoretical vagueness about the nature of a central 
factor within Sabatier’s approach: common beliefs.    
One difference to note between the advocacy coalition approach and constructivist thinking concerns 
policy learning: should policy-learning mean the incremental achievement by trial and error (Sabatier 
1988: 130) of better knowledge or should it rather be seen as a process of social construction, making 
knowledge itself a process-related set of beliefs, causal assumptions and any sort of taken-for-granted 
principles?  Since we tend to this latter understanding we complement the advocacy coalition framework 
by  using  discourse  analysis  based  on  social  constructivist  theory
20.  By  analyzing  a  wide  corpus  of 
governmental documents as well as publications of other social actors engaged in and important for the 
policy subsystem we want to examine social construction or “social learning” (Fleckenstein 2008: 181) 
processes as well as the processes of discourse manipulation.  
IV Comparative analysis: Modell Niederlande, New Deal, and Community Employment  
IV.1. Modell Niederlande: the Dutch Miracle and Enabling Activation 
In terms of varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001) the Netherlands has long been a fairly robust 
example  of  the  coordinated  market  economy  (Touwen,  2004),  with  a  long  and  deep  history  of 
corporatism.    Coordination  has  been  partly  accomplished  through  a  tight,  national-level  bi-partite 
corporatism that draws on an interconnected set of think-tanks and research institutes linked directly to Boyle/Schünemann  The Malleable Politics of Activation Reform  April 2009 
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(i)social partnership (Labour Foundation – STAR), (ii) the government (Netherland Bureau for Economic 
Analysis  –  CPB),  and  (iii)independent  experts  and  academics  (Netherlands  Scientific  Council  for 
Government  Policy  –  WRR).    This  system  constitutes  a  “regulative”  intelligence  with  considerable 
capacity for reflexive policy-making (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997, Eichhorst and Wintermann 2006). 
The  Dutch  welfare  state  is  usually  classified  within  the  Esping-Andersen  (1990)  typology  as 
Bismarckian (insurance-based, status-differentiated, focused on core workforce of male breadwinners), 
but the early post-war prominence of the Dutch version of the Beveridge model (the 1945 Van Rhijn 
Report)  gave  the  Dutch  welfare  state  a  universal,  social  democratic  dimension  distinct  from  the 
contemporaneous German social market economy model (Van Oorschot, 2006).  It was greatly expanded 
on  social  democratic  lines  in  the  1960’s,  but  in  the  1970’s  it  followed  the  Bismarckian  pattern  of 
addressing high unemployment by shrinking the labor supply.   
The national, highly proportional Dutch electoral system has always produced coalitional government, 
but rather than the 2-bloc pattern notable in other such systems (Scandinavia) Holland has had a pivotal 
party system, in which one of three parties – christian democratic, social democratic and liberal – is 
pivotal  to  coalition  formation,  and  governments  always  involve  any  2  of  these  three  parties  (Green-
Pederson 200: 963).  The other important feature of the Dutch party system is the pattern of insulated, 
elite-level bargaining, a legacy of Holland’s history of pillared consociationalism for managing once-deep 
social cleavages.   
The “Dutch Miracle” (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997) grew out of a 1982 fiscal and economic crisis with 
the election of the christian democratic-liberal Lubbers government and the Wassenaar social partnership 
agreement in which the key actor was Wim Kok: head of the Dutch union federation FNV; from 1986 
leader of the social democratic party PvdA; from 1989-94 Finance Minister in a Lubbers-led government; 
from 1994-99 prime minister of a social-christian coalition government;  and from 1999-2002 Prime 
Minister of a social democratic-liberal government.  The Wassenaar agreement was strongly influenced by 
reports and analysis by the STAR and CPD institutes (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997).  Macroeconomic 
policy rested on the three legs of pegging the guilder to the deutschemark, wage restraint and austerity in 
public expenditure.  Whilst there has undoubtedly been considerable welfare state retrenchment since 
1982 both its extent and the “activating” nature of much of this retrenchment has been overestimated.  
Aggregate measures for retrenchment by budgetary impact for 1982-1998 shows that the comparatively 
exceptional  retrenchment  has  been  in  the  area  of  pensions,  early-retirement  benefits  and  ,  most 
spectacularly, disability pensions rather than in the core area of unemployment benefits (Green-Pedersen, 
2001, Van Oorschot, 2006).  Even in these highly-retrenched areas spending has only been brought down 
to EU levels.  Unemployment insurance (WW), means-tested social assistance (ABW) and active labor 
market policy have a different pattern in aggregate spending.  Unemployment insurance spending has 
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policy have risen, in the case of the later rapidly so, from a comparatively low starting point to much 
higher than the EU-15 average.  Given that unemployment has fallen from over 10% in the early 1980’s to 
under 4% by 2000, the per-capita spending on these programs has risen very strongly.  As is well known 
aggregate spending is a poor guide to both retrenchment (Pierson 1994) and activation (Van Oorschott, 
2006).  A detailed review of “activating” policy reform shows that although there were significant reforms 
of unemployment insurance (WW) in 1985 and 1987 (reducing the wage replacement rate, limiting the 
duration of benefits and the number of workers eligible for it) and again in 2003 and 2004 (increasing the 
activating role of the administering municipalities and tipping more unemployment insurance beneficiaries 
into the social assistance category), the key window for activation measures was 1990-96 (Van Oorshot, 
2006). 
The 1989 Lubbers-Kok government’s biggest initial policy focused on anomalously large disability 
benefits (a 1989 speech by Lubbers being the trigger).  But for the activation strategy a 1990 WRR report 
“A working perspective” is credited by Hemerijck (2003) with triggering the paradigm shift in favor of 
employment growth and labor market integration rather than reducing labor supply as the earlier “lump of 
labor”  paradigm  suggested.    This  agenda  was  unfolded  during  the  Lubbers-Kok  and  Kok-Lubbers 
governments between 1991 and 1996.  CPB analysis in 1993-4 was particularly important in generating a 
cross-party agreement, the “Zalm norm” on restraining public expenditure, including the need to reduce 
benefit spending.  This party-political consensus was significant because the social partners were in a 
somewhat compromised position.  Historically the employers and unions had been deeply involved in the 
administration of unemployment insurance (and other social insurance, and employment services).  This 
system was transformed by the 1994-2002 Lubbers-led governments, to remove the veto power of the 
social partners.  This institutional reform has been described as “corporatist disengagement” (van der 
Veen and Trommel (1999).  It points to the primacy of the party consensus in the area of benefits rather 
than social partnership consensus (Schmidt, 2002).  Parties were also relatively immune from public 
opposition.  Protests were stronger in the area of pension and disability policy rather than unemployment 
benefits and social assistance, but it is certainly clear that the parties were not responding to electoral 
pressures, there is little evidence for an appetite for retrenchment, rather parties were acting on CPB and 
WRR analysis. 
The agenda regarding benefits unfolded in three parts: the 1995 reform of unemployment insurance 
(WW)  that  reduced  eligibility,  tipping  more  people  into  social  assistance  (AWB)  which  was  in  turn 
restricted in 1996: benefit rates were simplified, individual plans for reinsertion into the labor market were 
instituted for those on benefit and, most significantly, the standard for what constituted “suitable work” for 
an unemployed person was modestly broadened (van der Veen and Trommel (1999).  This was a fairly 
stringent reform in the Dutch context, but very modest in comparison with the contemporaneous work-
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Although the social partners were marginalized regarding the unemployment insurance, in the wider 
context a close coordination of policy initiatives with the social partners was maintained (there were 
intensified rounds of wage restraint in 1992 and 1993 in particular).  In the area of active labor market 
policy  this  was  especially  important.    CPB  analysis  was  instrumental  in  creating  the  1993  “A  New 
Course” agreement between the social partners that advocated turning “active labor market policy” into 
“activating” policy (Hemerijck 2003).  A battery of active labor market policy  programs targeted on 
different  categories  of  beneficiaries  (youth,  long-term  unemployed,  ethnic  minorities,  older  women 
returning to the labor market, partially disabled workers) was enhanced in 1992-6.  This targeted approach 
became increasingly attractive as the overall level of unemployment fell sharply 1993-7, leaving a harder-
core benefit population, as well as creating incentives for employers to address looming labor shortages.  
Whilst all of these measures constituted “coaxing” the unemployed into the labor market, they stopped 
short of compulsion.  Although the activation paradigm was now embraced by both the unions and the 
PvdA,  coercing  the  unemployed  was  beyond  the  Pale.    Not  only  was  a  mandatory  policy  on 
unemployment insurance and social assistance repudiated, these programs were supplemented by a raft of 
other policies that were explicitly “enabling”.  Policies to increase the attractiveness of part time work 
were introduced in 1992 and 1993 to enable women and elderly workers to participate.  Part time workers 
acquired equal rights to pension and other benefits in 1994 and the work-care balance was addressed in 
1995 to promote the ability of people with caring responsibilities to participate in the labor market ,further 
augmented by a 1999 law(Hemerijck et al, 2000) .   
The pattern noticeable in this rolling agenda is a graduated effort to increase activation with modest 
coaxing policies accompanied by fairly generous enabling ones.  Creating this finely balanced policy 
regime revolved around a coordinated, elite-level discourse among social partners, political parties and the 
designated policy expertise.  Whereas Green-Pederson focuses on the christian democrats as the pivotal 
party in welfare state retrenchment, for the activation window the key actors, parties, social partners and 
governments were anchored by the PvdA.  The enabling discourse at elite level was broad-based, but in 
terms  of  the  communicative  discourse  it  was  the  social  democrats  who  took  the  lead  in  articulating 
“enabling”  ideas  that  served  to  legitimize  the  activation  agenda,  whilst  distinguishing  it  from  the 
mandatory variant.  The PvdA was especially successful in cultivating the idea that the enabling activation 
agenda was in a very Dutch tradition of liberal tolerance regarding work and postindustrial values, “a 
multiple choice model of employment” (Hemerijck, 2000, 271).   
IV.2 New Labour, New Deal and Mandatory Activation 
The “New Deal” episode in 1997 in Britain is examined here to identify the source of policy ideas, the 
ideational contestation that took place and the forging of a “winning” policy consensus.  New Deal in 
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employer needs, but radically accelerating the mandatory trajectory.  The triumph of an interventionist 
neo-liberalism in 1981 and a welfare-to-work neo-liberalism in 1997-8 resulted from the construction of 
advocacy  coalitions  that  neutralized  opposition  without  compromising  core  neo-liberal  beliefs.    Ideas 
about national competitiveness among certain Thatcherite actors in 1981-3 and New Labour actors in 
1995-8 were crucial, in both instances these were party factions which had “hijacked” the larger party.   
The British political economy is often viewed as the archetypal Liberal Market Economy (Hall and 
Soskice(2001 and 2009) with a liberal welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990), and an industrial relations 
system that yielded only very weak forms of corporatism.  The unitary nature of executive authority in the 
British administrative system, together with the Westminster model of relatively unconstrained democratic 
majorities offers clearer opportunities for radical policy change than is true elsewhere in Europe.  The 
Thatcher  governments  are  widely  viewed  as  having  used  these  features  of  the  political  system  to 
accentuate the liberal characteristics of the political economy and welfare state, acting on a Hayeckian 
worldview.  However, the Thatcher project was more hybrid and incremental than is usually assumed.  
This is true of the highly incremental approach taken to reform of benefits in general such as the 1986 
Social Security Act, but it is particularly true for active labor market policy that was to become central for 
activation (Boyle, 2006).   
Despite  coming to power  in  1979  disliking what  little  there  was  of  Active  Labor  Market  Policy 
(ALMP) the Thatcher government had its “triangulation moment” in 1981
21 and developed a set of ALMP 
programs which involved a quintupling of expenditures and which, by the late 1980’s, had over one 
million people a year occupied on Manpower Services Commission (MSC) schemes.  The 1981 Youth 
Training  Scheme  was  the  principal  response  to  the  labor  market  crisis  in  the  first  Thatcher 
administration
22.    ALMP  1979-87  involved  a  prolonged  struggle  between  the  Manpower  Services 
Commission’s  “developmentalist”  or  “Rhenish”
23  pardigm  (the  German  model  being  the  universally 
admired  one  in  the  1970’s)  and  that  of  the  Thatcherites
24.    It  was  only  in  the  run-up  to  the  third 
Conservative election victory in 1987 that the Thatcherites made the shift towards a mandatory activation 
strategy.    Following  up  on  its  manifesto  commitment
25  the  government  introduced  the “Employment 
Training” (ET) program, the central element of an incipient workfare system
26.  Importantly, the main 
“ideas merchant” influential in the development and ancillary reforms was Kay Stratton, an American 
advisor parachuted into the Department of Employment by Secretary Fowler.  A former Massachusetts 
Secretary of Economic Affairs for Employment and Training, Stratton was brought in to promote school 
compacts, local training councils and a workfare system (Fowler, 1991: 291; Boyle 2006).   
The  cautious  (and  never  completed)  moves  towards  mandatory  activation  by  the  Thatcher 
governments broke the uneasy advocacy coalition of Thatcherites and the Rhenish MSC. The Labour 
Party and the unions moved to a stance of open repudiation of government policy.  Labour had adhered to 
the  “Rhenish”  model  in  government  and  opposition  from  1976-87
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election defeats the Party embarked on policy reviews during which incrementally modified this view.  
The 1992 Labour party manifesto, Meet the Challenge, Make the Change  made it clear that citizens “had 
to take responsibility for their own lives and fulfill their obligations to others”.  After the 1992 defeat the 
Party appointed the Commission on Social Justice to rethink social and labor market policy.  Employment 
flexibility  was  established  as  a  core  policy  value  and  a  new  welfare  ethic  based  on  a  redefinition 
individual rights and responsibilities was identified.  So the Labour party had already moved towards the 
“mutual obligations” idea central to the activation paradigms, but on the “enabling” end.  
The emergence of the Blair/Brown leadership of the Labour Party in 1994 precipitated an ideological 
refoundation of the party as “New Labour”
28.  Rooted in the notion of individual rights being inextricably 
linked to individual responsibility, the “modernizers” believed that labor market policy should be designed 
in accordance with these core beliefs. New Labour sought to establish tight eligibility criteria with time 
limits on traditional welfare benefit in an effort to dramatically reduce “welfare dependency”.  This core 
policy belief was cultivated with think-tanks
29 such as the Demos Institute, founded in 1993, and allied 
scholars such as Anthony Giddens. The influence of Demos and its neo-liberal ideas is evidenced by the 
appointment of Geoff Mulgan (co-founder of the Demos) to head Number 10’s Social Exclusion Unit in 
1997.
30  The US model loomed large for Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and the New Labour modernizers.  
Shared  neo-liberal  ideas  regarding  the  need  to  reform  labor  markets  in  order  to  make  them  more 
internationally competitive was rooted in the similar electoral struggles of the Labour and Democratic 
Parties  in  the  face  of  the  Anglo-American  new  right.    Clinton  championed  substituting  a  policy  of 
“workfare” in place of traditional welfare dependency.
31  New Labour had strong intellectual ties with key 
figures in the Clinton Administration
32.  Gordon Brown frequently met senior officials in the Clinton 
administration
33 to discuss fundamental aspects of economic policy strategy, often placing the issue of 
welfare and employment at the top of the list (Boyle and Roy, 2006).   
The New Deal initiative was part of a broader strategy aimed at fostering a partnership between 
individuals and government through a labor market paradigm based on the principle of helping individuals 
move from welfare-to-work.
34  This “individualized” or “client-based” (rather than provider-based) idea 
was a  significant  departure  from  the  earlier  model:  the  language  of  “conditionality”  replaced  that of 
“coercion”, but the underlying goal was much the same.  As “government in waiting” shadow Chancellor 
Gordon Brown sought to aggressively promote this agenda by proposing the raising of more money for 
youth training by planning austere limits on welfare benefits for the long-term unemployed.
35  Brown set 
out the main elements of New Deal in a 1995 speech.  The policy document, entitled “New Deal for a Lost 
Generation”, was presented on May 16, 1996
36.  The Labour government elected in 1997 was able to craft 
a policy once in power that maintained “deep core” normative belief about the necessity of youth to adapt 
to the labor market (and not vice versa) whilst forging a coalition out of “New Labor” modernizers and the 
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the  Thatcher  and  Major  governments.    Retaining  the  main  institutional  architecture  created  by  the 
Thatcher governments also avoided the sort of corporatist labor market institutions, central to the Rhenish 
model,  that  were  seen  by  the  New  Labour  government  as  too  rigid  and  interventionist  to  deal  with 
dynamically  changing  labor  market  conditions.  Their  corporatist  genealogy  was  embedded  in  the 
traditional welfare state apparatus that was viewed too expensive and unsupportable given new fiscal 
imperatives
37 (Boyle and Roy, 2006).  
In contrast to the German case, the British Labour Party came to power with a fully formulated plan: it 
was not engaged in “building the ship at sea”.  The “coordinating discourse” had occurred in opposition 
within an insulated group of New Labour politicians and theoreticians.  Whereas Brown was the key actor 
in the coordinating discourse, Blair was the key actor in the communicative one, which involved doing an 
“end-run” around internal party procedures and which then kicked into high gear in the run-up to the 1997 
election.  According to a textual analysis of 53 of Tony Blair’s speeches (Fairclough, 2000) “New Deal” 
(70 instances)  was  second  only  to  “New  Labour”  (72  instances) as  his  most  frequently used  phrase.  
Within the first 100 days of Labour being elected Chancellor Brown secured £3.1 billion to address youth 
unemployment, a fast-tracked discourse within government departments having been accomplished.
38  In 
1998 Employment Minister Andrew Smith issued a classically Blairite speech that formally launched New 
Deal into action.  Ministers directly involved with New Deal were determined that scheme should not be 
run by the education system.
39  New Deal was meant to be fundamentally different because it is based on 
local  partnerships  between  employers,  local  authorities,  training  providers,  Training  and  Enterprise 
Councils (TECs), Local Enterprise Companies, and Jobcentres.   
Thatcher’s 1981 initiative and New Labour’s 1997 New Deal demonstrate that in Britain the paradigm 
shift in labor market policy was based upon a qualitative shift from a core belief that governments can and 
(in cases of structural unemployment) should intervene in the labor market to a core belief that market 
mechanisms should determine the structure of labor markets and that at the bottom end of the labor market 
people had to be jolted into participation by denying them access to benefits.  Each initiative relied upon 
governments that were able to build sufficient support among potential ideational allies in the policy 
subsystem  for  their  agenda. The  ideas emanating  from  the New  Labour think  tanks  such as Demos, 
increasingly influenced by the experience of the Clinton administration with welfare reform, involved an 
acceptance of the “mandatory” activation approach:  stressing the responsibility of the unemployed to 
render  themselves  employable,  the  primacy  of  private  sector  employment,  and  the  proactive  role  of 
government in using the benefit system to “move people into work” coaxed where possible, but compelled 
where necessary.    
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IV.3 Activation Without Conditionality: social partnership and Community Employment in Ireland 
In terms of the core features of its political economy Ireland was little more than a politically independent 
region of the British political economy from 1922 to 1987: a liberal market economy, a liberal welfare 
state, and an industrial relations system that could sustain only a very weak corporatism.  Independence 
had led to a political system characterized on the one hand by a “British” administrative apparatus -
unitary, a dominating Finance Ministry, limited autonomy and weak capacity – Lee (2008) and on the 
other, thanks to the electoral system, parties which were heavily clientelistic rather than programmatic.  
The party system was a 2-bloc (but not left-right) until the 1980’s, but then moved to a pivot system.  By 
1987 this political system had yielded little but low growth and emigration, the 1958 shift to an open 
economic strategy and heavy investment in education in the 1970’s notwithstanding.  But Ireland didn’t 
do  Thatcherism.    EU  membership  opened  up  new  fiscal  and,  more  importantly,  new  ideological 
possibilities.    Whilst  Mrs.  Thatcher  was  dismantling  “Rhenish”  practices  in  Britain,  Ireland  was 
assembling  them,  despite  lacking  the  usual  preconditions  (Hardiman  1987).    Recent  DNA  evidence 
revealed Helmut Schmidt as the grandfather of Irish system of social partnership
40.   
It  was  out  of  social  partnership  that  the  ideas,  the  political  direction  (and  funding)  and  the 
administrative  capacities  for  Ireland’s  major  activation  policy  emerged.    At  elite-level  there  was  a 
developmentalist ideology  within government departments, para-state agencies and government social 
partnership and academic think tanks such as the NESC, the NESF and ESRI.  Ideas about national 
competitiveness among the Irish political elite, formulated as “social partnership”, have shaped policy in a 
way that has excluded features of the Anglo-American model.  Ireland has some markedly neo-liberal 
features.  But the tiger’s “golden” neo-liberal fiscal stripes are arranged alongside the black stripes of 
“social  partnership”
41.    Economic  policy  since  1987  has  revolved  around  a  comprehensive  “social 
partnership” that includes centralized wage bargaining coordinated with government social policy, but it 
also involves a much broader political and economic consensus on economic strategy negotiated by the 
social partners and political elites.  “Social partnership has strong cross party political support … [it] has 
in effect been elevated to a shared political ideology, which infuses all aspects of public policy-making 
and with minimal dissent” (Walsh, Craig and McCafferty, 1998: 15-16).  For some this is a novel model 
of “problem-solving”, negotiated economic and social governance (O’Donnell 2000a) especially in the 
National Development Plans, supported by all parties.  The Irish labor market agency FÁS, which was to 
loom large in the Irish activation initiative, was created in 1987
42 based on a 1985 NESC report that laid 
out the paradigm for a much enhanced comprehensive active labor market strategy.  FÁS was explicitly 
imitative  of  European  models  rather  than  Anglo-American  models  for  labor  market  policy
43  (Boyle 
2005
44.   
In terms of political direction both social partnership and the unemployment issue were matters of 
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cases) has from the start been directly administered by the Taoiseach’s office
45.  Funding for active labor 
market programming has remained strong because of support from the Department of Finance. The Delors 
windfalls
46 were important for FÁS training programming.  However, employment programs without a 
large training component, such as the Community Employment program, were not supported by EU funds.  
These were to become the largest part of the FÁS budget and Exchequer funding represented 100% of the 
cost of these programs.  FÁS was able to be very entrepreneurial and responsive to political directives
47.  
Net-cost calculus was important for Finance, which was particularly concerned to make savings from the 
social welfare budget.    
In terms of administrative capacity the Irish training agency FÁS in 1987 was crucial.  The creation of 
FÁS (An Foras Áiseanna Saothair) as an all-encompassing labor market agency represented the most 
concrete  institutional  instantiation  of  the  Irish  version  of  “social  partnership”.    This  agency,  which 
operated  under  the  social  partners,  had  an  “activationist”  house  philosophy.    It  was  also  a  largely 
autonomous  agency  appended  to  the  Department  of  Employment  and  completely  detached  from  the 
Department of Social Welfare.  Thus the Irish state had at its disposal an agency that was oriented to 
address  unemployment  through  active  labor  market  programming,  and  with  a  formidable  delivery 
apparatus to do so: Irish spending on active labor market programs has been high since the late 1980’s and 
affected a very large section of the population.
48  There was little interest in connecting this programming 
to social benefits (which have remained remarkably unreformed for the entire Celtic Tiger era) to the 
chagrin of the OECD, which has spent two decades bemoaning the lack of mandatory compulsion (OECD, 
2009), and Irish think tanks drawing on OECD research (Boyle 2005).   
The creation of the Community Employment program in 1994 represented a significant deepening of 
an “enabling” activation approach to combating unemployment and social exclusion.  The 1992 general 
election occurred with the prospect of 20% unemployment (a crisis equivalent to Germany’s in 2002).  
Taoiseach Albert Reynolds made policy to counter unemployment his chief priority (“get the feckin’ 
numbers down”).  In July 1992 a parliamentary report called for the rapid expansion of employment 
programs.    Fianna  Fail  sustained  heavy  losses  in  the  November  1992  elections  but,  after  tortured 
coalitional negotiations, a new Fianna Fail – Labour Party coalition took power
49.  This coalition drew up 
a “Program for Government” that, among other things, created a Community Employment Development 
Programme  (CEDP)  in  the  office  of  the  Taoiseach.    The  coalition  also  created  an  additional  social 
partnership  body,  the  National  Economic  and  Social  Forum  (NESF),  to  consider  the  unemployment 
problem and to include the “voluntary and community sector” as a third pillar alongside business and the 
unions.  The CEDP and the NESF introduced new sources of policy ideas, but at this point FÁS was able 
to take the initiative and it was FÁS’s policy development division that devised Community Employment.  
Labour Minister Quinn announced the program in January 1994, with a budget double that of existing 
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Substantial as this was, more radical proposals emerged from other sources. A June 1994 NESF report 
made  the  case  for  a  large  program  outside  FÁS.    In  September  1994  a  Taskforce  on  Long  Term 
Unemployment was announced, to report in early 1995
50.  FÁS was confronted from the “left” by an 
alternative neo-Keynesian (or social democratic) coalition involving key actors in the offices of the prime 
minister and deputy prime minister, the voluntary sector, and parts of the political left.  In December 1994 
the Fianna Fail – Labour coalition fell (over an unrelated scandal) and was replaced by a “Rainbow 
Coalition”  of  Fine  Gael, the  Labour  Party and  the  small Democratic  Left.    However,  the  change  of 
government did not alter the development of CE.  The challenge from the neo-Keynesians dissipated in 
1995 in the face of widespread support for the FÁS’s CE initiative.  CE involved a particularly striking 
mobilization of the community sector as sponsors of CE projects.  CE also received strong support from 
elected politicians
51.  Politicians, including serving ministers, are highly responsive to constituents (the 
Irish  STV  electoral  system  punishes  not  just  parties  but  individual  politicians  who  lose  touch  with 
constituents
52).  The partisan complexion of governments did not matter either.  All politicians had FÁS 
schemes in their constituencies.  It was also the case that any coalitional permutation would contain a 
party or party faction that was strongly pro-FÁS: this applied to the populist wing of the Fianna Fail 
party
53 (future Taoiseach Bertie Ahern being the best example, and one od several senior Fianna Fail 
figures who explicitly labeled themselves “socialists” (Boyle 2005a)) and to the Labour Party and the 
Democratic Left.  Traditionally the alternative to a Fianna Fail government was a coalition of the more 
conservative Fine Gael and the Irish Labour Party.  However, an especially strong electoral performance 
by  Labour  in  the 1992 election  meant  that  it served  as  the  pivotal  party  1992-97  and  the  anchor  of 
governments introducing CE (Boyle 2005).  
In addition to a challenge from a neo-Keynesian advocacy coalition FÁS and CE faced a challenge 
from a rival coalition to the “right” which drew its inspiration from “New Labour” in Britain and that was 
interested in making the connection between Ireland’s activational apparatus and benefit conditionality.  
This rival coalition had the sympathy of the two Employment Ministers who oversaw FÁS and active 
labor market policy from 1994-2004: Richard Bruton, Fine Gael Employment Minister in the 1994-7 
Rainbow  coalition,  and  Mary  Harney,  leader  of  the  neo-liberal  Progressive  Democratic  Party  and 
Employment Minister in the Fianna Fail-PD government 1997-2004.  This alternative coalition also drew 
heavily on support from think tanks such as the ESRI and the OECD.  Reports by consultants criticizing 
the  operation  of  CE  were  also  deployed.    The  economically  liberal  Richard  Bruton  had  become 
sympathetic to a growing chorus of opposition to FÁS programming from employers
54.  The paradigmatic 
influence over a Human Resource Development White Paper written by Employment Minister Bruton was 
the “New Labour”
55 neo-liberalism of Blair and Brown.  Officials were much influenced by Blairite
56 
thinking  and  the  rhetoric  of  responsibility  regarding  the  unemployed,  and  were  especially  prone  to 
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“conditionality” (code words for a connection between work and social welfare benefits); “targeting”; and 
“early interventions” were cited by Department officials as Blairite euphemisms for a harsher regime.  
Human  Resource  Development,  originating  within  the  Department  of  Employment,  drew  heavily  on 
expert analysis of policy, together with an employer call for employer-centered and employer-led active 
labor market policy
57.  It was as close to a “mandatory” activation proposal as was possible in the Irish 
setting, but even this was easily garroted by the FÁS-based coalition in 1997.  Grass-roots opposition to 
the proposal was channeled through the clientelistic political system.  The evidence that politicians cite is 
largely drawn from their constituency service caseload rather than an “expert” analysis: Irish politicians 
are persuaded by anecdote not regression analysis.
58  One disadvantage that this coalition had was for all 
their Blairite rhetoric they were easily labeled “Thatcherite”, the kiss of death in Irish political discourse.  
CE  not  only  survived  the  “mandatory”  challenge  in  1996-7,  it  withstood  both  the  end  of  high 
unemployment  and  the  1997-2004  tenure  of  the  neo-liberal  Mary  Harney  as  Emploment  Minister, 
becoming a permanent fixture
59 in the armory of the Irish state for addressing “problem” categories such 
as the disabled, single parents, mentally ill and addicts
60.  Having defeated the neo-Keynesians in 1993-5, 
the FÁS social partnership coalition routed the “Irish Blairites” 1995-2000. 
This “victory” of the FÁS-based coalition has been definitive (Boyle, 2005; Martin and Gubb, 2001; 
McCashin, 2004).  Ireland has retained its activation-without-conditionality policies, and the enabling-
without-mandatory policy  paradigm  to this  day.    The  administration  of  unemployment  insurance  and 
social assistance has remained almost entirely separate from activation
61, and activation via FÁS remained 
voluntary, a light requirement for the long term unemployed to register with FÁS exists, but as the 2009 
OECD report states: “Ireland is in the small group of countries where the sanction decision for refusal of 
work and for refusal of a place on an ALMP program are well below 0.1% per unemployed person per 
year” (OECD, 2009:134). 
In Ireland the creation of FÁS and the expansion of active labor market policy in the 1987-1994 period 
established  a  new  policy  trajectory  that  combined  enabling  activation  through  active  labor  market 
programming but without benefit conditionality, a separation that has remained remarkably robust. The 
coordinative  discourse  within  Irish  social  partnership,  especially  the  most  concrete  instantiation  of 
partnership,  the  Irish  training  agency  FÁS,  facilitated  a  radical  and  path  deviant  policy,  that  a 
communicative  discourse  driven  by  elected  Irish  politicians  then  sustained.    The  availability  of  an 
administrative instrument (FÁS) rooted in social partnership, focused on “activational” programming but 
administratively and paradigmatically separate from social welfare policy created the opportunity for a 
reflexive, consensual initiative. 
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V Neo-liberalism in one class: Germany and the Hartz reforms 
V.1.   The Bismarckian Path 
In the Esping-Andersen typology of welfare regimes Germany is the conservative archetype with social 
systems designed according to a common model: insurance based, contribution funded (by employers and 
employed),  self-administered.    Unemployment  insurance  was  not  part  of  this  first  step  of  welfare 
development under Bismarck, but was added to the social system as a fourth pillar in 1927 (Gesetz über 
Arbeitslosenvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung, AVAVG) but the traditional Bismarckian structure 
was left intact.  A central service was established for administering the system, the Reichsanstalt für 
Arbeit.  Labor market policy was basically passive.  Unemployment insurance was now treated as a more 
or less regular status in working life and working people were secured against the related losses in income 
as well as social status.  Every unemployed person had from 1927 on a legitimate claim of unemployment 
benefits, instead of former means-tested social assistance.  Active labor market policy played a marginal 
role.  The creation of unemployment insurance can thus be seen as a path dependent development of 
German welfare state (Schmidt/Ostheim 2007: 138). 
The first substantial change in this regard was implemented by the grand coalition between christian 
democrats (CDU/CSU) and social democrats (SPD) after an economic crisis in 1966 (Stabilitätsgesetz, 
1967).  In 1969 the so-called Employment promotion law (Arbeitsförderungsgesetz) expanded for the first 
time instruments of preventive and active labor market policy, such as placement, public training and job 
creation schemes as well as employment subsidies for certain branches.  This “add-on” was inspired, as 
were others across Europe, by the perceived success of such programs in Sweden (the Rehn-Meidner 
model).  Although innovative means of active labor market policy were appended Germany did not depart 
the Bismarckian path.  All social insurance branches were rebuilt after 1945 as contribution-funded and 
self-administered institutions (Errichtungsgesetze), now based on tripartite agreement between employers’ 
associations, trade unions and state government, the former Reichsanstalt für Arbeit was renamed into 
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit. 
Under the Brandt coalition with the liberal FDP, 1969-1974, the German welfare state was expanded.  
The extension touched almost every part of the system and social expenditure costs reached almost 34% 
of  public  expenditure  in 1975  (Pilz 2004:  38).    In face  of  the  first  oil  crisis  the  Schmidt SPD/FDP 
government embarked on a course correction and reacted with moderate but nonetheless unpopular cuts in 
social spending, including active labor market policy (Haushaltsstrukturgesetz 1975).  Some observers 
even consider this policy change a critical break in German welfare state development because for the first 
time there was retrenchment (Hegelich/Meyer 2008: 131).  The growing number of unemployed (7.5 % of 
the  employable  population  in  1982)  and  the  fiscal  consequences  of  this  destabilized  the  SPD-FDP 
coalition.  In 1982 former economic minister Otto Graf Lambsdorff (FDP) presented a conceptual paper 
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was inspired by neoliberal, Thatcherite  thinking and already contained many conceptions which resemble 
to core ideas of the Hartz reforms, e.g. reduction of regular duration for unemployment benefits to 12 
months, the restriction of reasonability rules, the accentuation on personal responsibility etc. (Butterwegge 
et al. 2007: 137).  Schmidt evaluated his minister’s paper as a “paper of divorce” (Butterwegge 2007).  
Just a few weeks later he was deposed by a CDU/FDP-coalition under Helmut Kohl.  
Despite  initial  austerity  (Haushaltsbegleitgesetze  1983/84)  the  Kohl  governments  1982-90  were 
cautious in well established “Keine Experimente!” CDU tradition
62.  Labor minister Norbert Blüm, the 
only cabinet minister to serve the entire length of Kohl’s government, personified this rather cautious and 
path  dependent  trajectory  concerning  social  reforms.    After  1985  more  money  was  spent,  including 
improvements in active and passive labor market policy whilst on the other hand the labor market was 
made marginally more flexible.  From 1982 to 1990 social spending was reduced from 30.7 to 27.6 
percent, but the centre-right policy was essentially incremental and Lambsdorff’s precocious mandatory 
activation ideas of 1982 were shelved.  In effect, these reforms attempts could be classified as a “halfway 
turnaround”  (Josef  Schmid,Ostheim/Schmidt  2007:  171).    Re-unification  in  1990  stopped  the 
consolidation  efforts  and  in  the  following  years  social  expenditure  costs  grew  dramatically  whilst 
unemployment  reached  new  records  (Trampusch  2005:  7).    When  adapting  the  former  state-directed 
economy of the DDR to the Western German social market economy the government was confronted with 
structural unemployment of a dimension not known before.  In order to promote employment particularly 
in Eastern Germany active labor market policy was radically extended.  Since the financial burden for re-
unification was largely carried by federal government as well as social insurances – a concession made to 
the Western German Länder (Pilz 2004: 43) – social expenditures soared.  In 1997 a new employment 
promotion law (Arbeitsförderungsgesetz) which foresaw more stringent means in fighting unemployment 
was enacted.  This reform can be seen as a first step towards an activating policy because more flexibility 
on the part of the unemployed was foreseen, as was restriction of the reasonability criteria.  Despite these 
belated steps the common perception prevailed that not even under Kohl and his centre-right government 
was  fundamental  social  policy  reform  possible.    Many  observers  referred  to  this  as  “Reformstau” 
(Streeck/Kitschelt, 2003) or the “blocked Republic”
63.  What were argued to be essentially needed social 
reforms had been either vetoed by corporatist opposition in socio-economic negotiation processes or by 
political opposition through a hostile majority in the upper house, the Bundesrat (the joint decision trap).  
At the  same time  in  1998  unemployment  reached over  4  million people  (12.3  % of  the  employable 
population), and in these circumstances led to Schröder’s substantial victory in 1998. 
Unemployment  was  the  central  issue  of  the  1998  election.    Schröder  promised  a  reduction  of 
unemployment  from  over  4  to  3.5  million  by  2002.    Having  been  elected  into  power  the  red-green 
government initially followed a traditional social democratic policy in social and economic fields.  The 
neo-Keynesian Lafontaine was finance minister and party leader until his unexpected resignation in 1999.  Boyle/Schünemann  The Malleable Politics of Activation Reform  April 2009 
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As regards labor market the first Schröder government implemented a re-regulation by withdrawing social 
reforms such as deregulation of dismissal protection realized under Kohl (Zohlnhöfer 2004: 286).  At the 
end  of  1998  Schröder  also  created  the  “Alliance  for  Jobs,  Training  and  Competitiveness”  as  central 
strategic initiative for employment policy.  The Alliance for Jobs (Bündnis für Arbeit) was a trade union 
idea and characterized by a rather traditional conception of labor market policy formation: following a 
tripartite logic consensus should be reached between government represented by the labor ministry, trade 
unions  and  employer  associations.    A  Benchmarking  Committee,  organized  and  funded  by  the 
Bertelsmann Foundation, delivered expert advice for reform.  So, before Hartz social and labor market 
policy was still pre-shaped by corporatist negotiations between employers and unions.  It was up to the 
social  and  labor  ministry  to  moderate  these  negotiations.    In  the  parliamentary  process  the  policy 
subsystem was confined to party politicians with social policy background and expertise (especially SPD 
and CDU politicians with close ties to unions and business).  Laws merely implemented the consensual 
decisions of social partners which were represented within the parties by important factions and their 
speakers
64 (Trampusch 2005: 5). 
Parallel  to  the  creation  of  the  Alliance  for  Jobs  Schröder  provoked  protest  within  the  SPD  by 
publishing a common position paper with the British Prime Minister Tony Blair.  The so-called Schröder-
Blair paper (Schröder/Blair 1999) had been written by the British Minister for Trade and Industry Peter 
Mandelson  and  the  Head  of  German  Chancellery  Bodo  Hombach  (both  viewed  as  éminences  grises 
figures by the left wing of their respective parties).  It was influenced by Anthony Giddens’ conception of 
a Third Way which was transposed in the German concept of “Neue Mitte”.  The paper was a manifesto 
for modernization of social democracy and contained ideas finally implemented in Germany with the 
Hartz reforms. 
The major policy result of the Alliance for Jobs was the Job-AQTIV law (Activation, Qualification, 
Training, Investment, Placement) which came into force in January 2002.  The reform already shared the 
focus on activation with the later Hartz reforms but since it was negotiated under strong influence by the 
unions it still concentrated on the enabling part of activation and so-called positive activation means 
(Zohlnhöfer 2004: 386, Fleckenstein 2008: 186-187): improved placing and training of jobseekers by job 
rotation and a better profiling process for the unemployed.  The Labor Ministry under Walter Riester took 
from November 1998 to May 2001 to draft the law.  After its implementation it was criticized by trade 
unions as well as employers (Schierholz 2002: 405).  The business camp criticized the law arguing that it 
was far too ambiguous, especially as regards negative or coercive means of activation. 
The results of the Alliance for Jobs were commonly evaluated as very limited.  The Alliance was 
dissolved by Schröder in 2003 – just a short time before his proclamation of the Agenda 2010 – although 
it already had been paralyzed one year before (Trampusch 2005: 11).  With the Alliance for Jobs the 
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led by Wolfgang Clement, saw the Alliance as the expression of the SPD’s traditional commitment to 
Rhineland or cooperative capitalism” (Dyson 2005: 230).  Schröder needed an alternative.   
V.2 The radicalism of Hartz Reforms 
As the term “Hartz” is often used to describe a wide array of ideas and policies, we need to specify the 
radical policy change at the heart of the Hartz process that we are focusing on in this paper .  The four 
Hartz laws were passed in 2002 (Hartz I + II) and in 2003 (Hartz III
65 + IV), see Fig. 3.  The legislation 
had  been  prepared  by  an  expert  commission  chaired  by  Peter  Hartz,  a  former  personnel  manager  at 
Volkswagen  and  confidant  of  Chancellor  Schröder,  in  2002.    The  structure  of  the  Hartz  reforms  is 
summarized below, with the radical mandatory activation elements highlighted. 
-  The first and the second law for modern services in labor market (Hartz I + II) came into force in 
January 2003 and created new forms of labor and more flexibility, especially in the low income area 
(mini-jobs and midi-jobs) and for self-employed persons (Ich-AG).  The integration of jobseekers into the 
labor market was to be improved by the creation of Job Centres as one-stop-shops with a more efficient 
service for their “clients”.  Other changes in ALMP were also implemented.   
-  The most important element of this first legislation package, namely of Hartz I, from our 
perspective was the redefinition of reasonable jobs for unemployed which introduced compulsion as 
distinctive  factor  into  the  system.    The  former  reasonability  rules  for  reintegration  into  labor 
market have been given up as far as possible (s. § 121 SGB [Code of Social Law] III), much further 
than in the Dutch case.  The long time unemployed have to accept almost every job without respect 
to their former living standard or their educational status.  By refusing a job offer claimants risk 
cuts in benefits (s. § 144 SGB III).  Furthermore it is up to the unemployed to deliver arguments 
why a job offer is not reasonable.  Hence, the burden of proof shifted from government agencies to 
the unemployed (Dyson 2005: 236).  The compulsory placing also obtains for the new instrument of 
additional  work  opportunities,  the  so-called  Ein-Euro-Jobs,  which  can  be  offered  by 
community/charitable institutions and mean an additional income for unemployed of about one 
Euro per hour like Irish Community Employment, but with benefit compulsion. 
-  Hartz III entered into force in January 2004 and effected a structural remodeling of the former 
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (public employment service) into the new Bundesagentur für Arbeit (public 
employment agency). 
-  The most controversial element of Hartz reforms was Hartz IV which has in the popular discourse 
become something of an all-embracing code for the reform process as well as for the new unemployment 
benefit for recipients.  From January 2005 the former unemployment assistance and the former 
social assistance benefits were integrated into a new tax-funded and means-tested unemployment 
benefit  II  (Arbeitslosengeld  or  ALG  II).    The  regular  maximum  duration  of  the  insurance  based 
unemployment benefit, now called Arbeitslosengeld or ALG I, was reduced from up to 32 months before 
reform to 18 months for persons older than 55 and 12 months for regular unemployed (s. § 127 SGB III) 
now.
66 As Fleckenstein put it: “unemployment benefit II effectively became the benefit system for the 
long-term unemployed” (Fleckenstein 2008: 179).  Since at the same time the regular benefits of ALG II 
were aligned to the level of former social assistance (345 Euros) the Hartz IV reform brought significant 
social cuts for many unemployed persons in Germany.
67 Even more: “Hartz IV, having merged social and 
unemployment  assistance  onto  social  assistance  level,  is  the  most  substantial  benefit  cut  since  the 
existence of the Federal Republic” (Trampusch 2005: 3, modification by authors).   
 
The special radicalism of Hartz reforms thus can be seen in the combination of Hartz IV (Dyson 
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been summarized by citing the melodic governmental phrase of Fördern und Fordern (Promoting and 
Demanding
68).  We concentrate on “Fordern” part, since the elements of Hartz reform chosen by us: Neue 
Zumutbarkeit (new reasonability) and Hartz IV are instruments of coercing people into work by putting 
pressure onto them (s. fig. 3).  The “Fördern” reforms are themselves either unremarkable administrative 
restructuring or they are changes specifically designed to hinge on the “Fordern” elements.  This is a 
mandatory-centered  reform,  abandoning  ideas  of  securing  living  standards  for  the  unemployed  and 
“welfare without work” which can be seen as “a critical moment in the departure from the conservative 
welfare model” (Fleckenstein 2008: 178-179). 
Figure 3: Basic Structure of Hartz Reforms 
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fiscal and health care policies.  Overall, the reforms entailed a radical departure from the Bismarckian 
social policy tradition, a clear path deviant case.  
V.3   Deviation: Schröder and the ensilaged (wrapped) reform discourse 
To be elected in 1998 Schröder had given the ambitious promise to reduce unemployment significantly, as 
he himself stated this was how his performance should be judged.  But in 2002 4 million people were still 
unemployed.  Facing upcoming general elections in September Schröder felt obliged to act.  He and his 
party were confronted with an electoral dilemma: on the one hand the SPD had to demonstrate its reform 
capacity, especially as regards labor market policy.  On the other hand substantial social reforms always 
constitute a serious risk concerning election strategy (Zohlnhöfer 2004: 395). 
Figure 4: Composition of Hartz Commission 
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GmbH;  HS:  Harald  Schartau,  Minister  for  Labor  and  Social  Affairs  NRW;  WS:  Wilhelm  Schickler, 
President  Regional  Employment  Service  Hesse;  HES:  Hanns-Eberhard  Schleyer,  General  Secretary 
Central Association of German Handcraft; GS: Günther Schmid, Social Science Research Center Berlin; 
WT: Wolfgang Tiefensee, Mayor of Leipzig; EV:   Eggert Voscherau, Executive Board BASF AG. 
Facing the collapse of the Alliance for Jobs, the Schröder government felt impelled to avoid the 
traditional procedural strategy of tripartite deliberation including a wide range of actors and potential veto 
players.  Labor market policy became Schröder’s top priority, Chefsache, and the government chose an 
innovative  discursive  strategy  for  publicly  presented  policy  formation.    The  new  coordinative  and 
communicative discourses (Schmidt 2002) addressed the electoral timetable, but, more importantly for our 
purposes,  it  also  provided  a  novel,  accelerated  way  to  devise  and  deliver  radical  reform.    When  in 
February 2002 the German Federal Audit Court discovered false statistics on job placements from the 
public  employment  service  (Bundesanstalt  für  Arbeit)
69,  the  traditional  institution  was  blamed.    Its 
president Jagoda resigned and left his place for a social democratic modernizer, Florian Gerster.  These 
special conditions at the beginning of 2002 opened a “window of opportunity” (Eichhorst/Wintermann 
2006:  3)  and  allowed  Schröder  to  follow  a  government-by-commission  strategy  (Dyson  2005)  by 
establishing the Commission on modern services in the labor market chaired by Peter Hartz.  Besides 
Hartz  14  other  experts  were  appointed:  6  entrepreneurs  and  business  consultants,  one  member 
representing  handcraft,  two  unionists, two  researchers,  one regional and  one local  politician  and  one 
representative from a regional bureau of the public employment service (s. fig. 4).  
 After six months of Commission negotiations the final report was presented in August 2002.  In June 
the first proposals were floated to the media and a public debate about labor market reform and the 
proposals expected from Hartz Commission began.  The report of about 340 pages proposed 13 innovation 
modules for labor market reform.  In addition to proposals concerning ALMP and enabling activation 
sharp mandatory means, e.g. by restricting reasonability rules, were contained as well as the integration of 
unemployment and social assistance into one.  Cutting benefits for recipients and shortening the maximum 
duration of unemployment benefit had indeed been discussed during the negotiations; due to trade unions’ 
opposition it was not formally included as a proposal and hence was not part of the final report.  But the 
idea was ”outed” and the second Schröder government implemented the controversial innovations as part 
of the Agenda 2010 in 2003, despite having been explicitly excluded by the election manifesto of the SPD 
for the general elections one year before (Trampusch 2005: 11-12, Pilz 2004: 154).  The report promised – 
if implemented – to halve unemployment within the following three years. 
As major social cutbacks had been kept out of the final report and the upcoming elections had a certain 
“disciplinary effect on opposition to Schröder within the SPD” (Fleckenstein 2008: 181) as well as trade 
unions, the shift to a mandatory paradigm of activation although criticized by unions was nevertheless 
generally accepted by them given the more welcome “enabling” proposals which were also contained in 
the proposals and the general discursive background for substantial labor market reform.  At this point Boyle/Schünemann  The Malleable Politics of Activation Reform  April 2009 
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protests by union representatives were limited and many of them as well as union-affiliated researchers 
praised the outcome of Hartz Commission such as a leading figure of SPD’s left wing Ottmar Schreiner 
(Schreiner 2002).  Protest came from opposition parties but that protest relied much less on substantial 
divergences as regards content than on the electoral timetable that made the Hartz report’s debut a big 
campaign event for the SPD (that CDU and FDP politicians refused to join).  For the CDU/CSU and FDP 
the neo-liberal direction of Hartz report was right, if a little too unambitious (Rainer Brüderle, FDP, 
Fickinger 2002b, Wolfgang Gerhardt, FDP, Heuwagen 2002). 
The  final  report’s  presentation  was  just  a  few  weeks  before  general  elections.    After  his  widely 
unexpected  victory
70  in  the  elections  Schröder  started  to  act  on  his  promise  of  implementing  Hartz 
proposals “1 to 1” (all or nothing).  He established a new Federal Ministry of Economics and Labor, 
merging  the  formerly  separated  entities  and  appointed  one  of  the  leading  figures  of  the  economic 
modernizers  within  the  SPD  Wolfgang  Clement  as  “super”  minister,  and  although  the  red-green 
coalition’s  policies  initially  appeared  unprepared,  in  December  2002  Schröder  demanded  a  stop  this 
“cacophony” within the coalition. 
The second phase of the communicative discourse started when Schröder announced his Agenda 2010 
in a ”set piece” speech to the German Bundestag in March 2003.  Having presented the factual scope of 
reforms – which included more radical welfare state retrenchments than Hartz Commission did for the 
labor market – the anticipated protest suddenly grew, especially from the “traditionalist” camp within the 
SPD and the unions.  In the following months until enactment in autumn/winter there were brutal fights 
within the SPD, whereas SPD modernizers in government were able to build something like a grand 
coalition with the centre-right opposition (Trampusch 2005: 18).  In effect, advocacy coalitions had been 
rebuilt  from  four  to  two  (s.  fig.  5)  with  SPD  modernizers  now  aligned  with  ordo-liberals  from  the 
opposition.  Just after the general election the SPD lost in several regional elections and the opposition 
parties had a majority in the Bundesrat.  Hartz IV was further modified towards more neo-liberal ideas 
through the arbitration committee between Bundestag and Bundesrat.  These consensus needs could be 
used to justify radical policy and to bypass resistance within the SPD. Although there had been some 
public demonstrations against the Hartz reforms and the Agenda 2010 already in autumn 2003, especially 
a  central  one  on  November,  1
st  in  Berlin  with  over  100,000  participants,  the  real  and  repeated 
demonstrations  against  Schröder’s  reform  package  commonly  labeled  as  Hartz  IV  demonstrations  or 
Monday demonstrations
71 did not reach their peak before August 2004, a long time after the Hartz laws 
were enacted and only a few months before Hartz IV was implemented.  On August, 30
th 2004 at least 
200,000 people demonstrated against the social reforms in over 200 cities, with smaller and less regular 
demonstrations continuing until 2006.  The anti-Hartz social movement was to trigger the establishment of 
a new party in German political system built by disappointed former SPD-members and unionists, the 
WASG (Wahlalternative Arbeit und soziale Gerechtigkeit, Election alternative Labor and Social Justice) Boyle/Schünemann  The Malleable Politics of Activation Reform  April 2009 
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in 2004
72.  In 2007 WASG and the largely Eastern German left party PDS merged and created Die Linke 
(the left).  Thus the path deviant Hartz reforms of the German welfare state resulted also in a re-shaping of 
the political landscape as well as parliamentary party-representation. 
 
Figure 5: 4-to-2-logic of advocacy coalitions in the German case 
 
V.4   Manipulating Discourse: the dyadic discourse strategy behind Hartz reforms 
Our  discourse  analysis  entails  detailed  examination  of  45  documents  (parliamentary  speeches,  party 
publications, interviews, etc.) by key social actors in a first phase from the placement scandal in February 
2002 until the first two Hartz laws passed legislation in December and a second phase from Schröder’s 
Agenda speech in March 2003 until legislation of Hartz III and IV in December 2003.   
Instead of a traditional tripartite negotiation process the Schröder government chose by establishing 
the Hartz Commission an innovative discursive strategy  mimicking the British mode of an ensilaged 
coordinative discourse followed by a didactic communicative discourse.  Since in 2002 Schröder’s agenda 
was shaped by a tough election timetable – in contrast to Blair/Brown Schröder did have to “build his ship 
at sea” – he had to accelerate the process by combining major parts of coordinative and communicative 
discourse.  And since the German tradition of labor market policy formation was more reflexive and the 
didactic,  top-down  style  less  acceptable  to  the  public  than  in  Britain  Schröder  had  to  transpose  the 
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innovative  ideas  already  agreed  on  through  a  legitimating  interface  with  the  public  via  the  Hartz 
Commission.  Although we largely agree with Fleckenstein that the Hartz Commission “can be considered 
largely insignificant for the substance of the legislation” because policy formation based on social learning 
already had taken place in the expert forum on the future of employment organized by the Bertelsmann 
Foundation before Hartz (Fleckenstein 2008: 178) we argue that the Commission played a significant role 
at  least  in  legitimation  politics.    Hartz  and  his  team  constituted  this  crucial  interface  between  the 
coordinative (special) and communicative (public) discourse.  A statement by a Commission member 
extracted from a newspaper interview published the day the Hartz report was presented supports this 
argument:  “the  Commission  has  become  such  an  event  that  no  government  can  easily  ignore  it” 
(Hagelüken/Viering  2002).    Whereas  among  economic  experts  a  wide  consensus  about  countering 
unemployment  had  already  been  established  before  Hartz  many  of  these  new  ideas  were  highly 
controversial within the public discourse as well the SPD, the Greens and the unions.  With the Hartz 
Commission Schröder’s government chose a discursive rather than the traditional procedural strategy of 
policy  formation.    The  strategy  of  discourse  manipulation  was  dyadic:  1.  excluding  speakers  or  de-
legitimizing speaker positions, 2. constructing knowledge or re-framing fundamental ideas.  So, the Hartz 
Commission didn’t so much seek to “bind in” opposition from SPD traditionalists open to “enabling 
activation” but rather to cast it off.  The next two subsections of the paper summarize the discourse 
analysis undertaken for the 2002 and 2003 phases mentioned above. 
IV.4.1  Excluding speakers and de-legitimizing speaker positions 
The first remarkable effect of Hartz Commission’s establishment is the significant reduction of speakers 
within  the  coordinative  discourse.    Normally  Germany  can  be  seen  as  the  archetype  of  cooperative 
capitalism which means that a great amount of interest groups’ representatives are engaged in policy 
formation, particularly  within the labor market policy  subsystem.  Besides trade unions and business 
associations  as  well  as  their  relative  party  wings  and  political  speakers  the  German  socio-economic 
landscape has a wide range of advisory institutions.  Eichhorst and Wintermann give a comprehensive list 
of  four  types  of  institutions  engaged  in  delivering  advice  in  economic  and  labor  market  issues 
(Eichhorst/Wintermann  2006):  first,  independent  institutes  for  economic  advice  consisting  of  the  six 
leading economist institutes in Germany: German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Ifo Institute for 
Economic Research, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Rhenish-Westphalian Institute for 
Economic Research (RWI), Kiel Institute for World Economics, Halle Institute for Economic Research 
(IWH) as well as two institutes for Social Sciences: the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies 
(MPIfG) and Social Science Research Center at Berlin (WZB), second research institutes with affiliations 
to other institutions like the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) which is subordinated to public 
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and the Institute of Social and Economic Research (WSI) with affiliations to unions.  Third think tanks 
funded by foundations, such as Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) funded by German Post Foundation 
and  different  expert  groups  organized  and  funded  by  the  Bertelsmann  Foundation,  and  last  the 
government-appointed German Council of Economic Advisors.  So besides political parties, trade unions, 
business  associations,  local  and  regional  authorities  a  wide  range  of  advisory  institutions  can  have 
significant impact on labor market policy formation in Germany.  In the ensilaged Pre-Hartz coordinative 
discourse  the  Bertelsmann  Foundation  was  the  crucial  actor.    Through  the  expert  forum  and  the 
Benchmarking Committee for the Alliance for Jobs (Eichhorst 2001, Eichhorst 2004), both organized and 
funded by the Bertelsmann Foundation, the foundation had a significant influence in pre-shaping the 
policy outcomes (Fleckenstein 2008).  It also provided assistance for the Hartz Commission. 
The Hartz  Commission  itself  consisted  of  only  fifteen  experts including  a relative  majority  from 
business camp (managers and business consultants).  The other relevant social actors (trade unions, public 
employment  service,  local  authorities  and  science)  were  represented  by  selected  persons  mostly 
considered  “modernizers”  within  their  respective  camps.    Nothing  resembling  the  former  tripartite 
negotiations and resultant blockage was to be permitted.  That was true for the ensilaged coordinative 
discourse as well as the communicative discourse just until the federal elections in September 2002.  
Although largely marginalized within the coordinative discourse – “Agenda setting was taken out of the 
hands of Riester, IG Metall and the DGB.” (Dyson 2005: 234) – before the elections unions could not 
totally be excluded from the game.  So it was due to unions’ opposition that the final Hartz report did not 
contain the harsher social cutbacks that had been discussed earlier and the SPD election manifesto stated 
that unemployment benefits would not be cut.  Whilst on the one hand the upcoming elections had a 
disciplinary  effect  on  the  unions,  the  same  elections  had  on  the  other  hand  a  moderating  effect  on 
Schröder government and the Hartz Report because in the campaign support from unions and the left wing 
of  the  SPD  was  needed.    When  it  became  apparent  that  the  reduction  of  maximum  duration  of 
unemployment benefit would not be part of the final report employers’ associations as well as CDU and 
FDP opposition changed their initial positive reaction and criticized the Hartz Commission.  This was seen 
in terms of the unions’ negative influence: “The bigger unions’ pressure gets the more their own courage 
seems to disappear” (Rogowski, BDI, Schumacher 2002, Frankfurter Allgemeine 2002, Petersdorff 2002). 
After the election victory the situation changed dramatically.  The strategy of excluding speakers 
changed into a strategy of de-legitimizing speaker positions.  And the first and clearest victims were trade 
unions  and  their  representatives.    In  the  still  prevailing  atmosphere  of  “Reformstau”  unions  were 
considered the main blocking forces, even by the SPD modernizers.  The clear signal was Schröder’s 
creation of a Ministry for Economy and Labor and the appointment of Wolfgang Clement into this new 
office.  Former labor minister Walter Riester, a unionist, was deposed.  Already after the placement 
scandal social democratic modernizer, Florian Gerster was installed as Director of the public employment Boyle/Schünemann  The Malleable Politics of Activation Reform  April 2009 
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service.  So, in 2003 when Schröder government had chosen a radical path of welfare state remodeling the 
unions  and  their  supporters  stood  largely  alone  and  were  criticized  from  all  sides  as  old-fashioned 
‘traditionalists’: “Unions would be well advised to redefine themselves“ (Fickinger 2002b); “Of course, 
unions must move and must renew themselves” (Schröder 2003: 21).  After the Hartz Report and Agenda 
speech everybody, particularly within the SPD, had to take care not to be considered part of the blocking 
forces.  A strong camp within the party promoted itself as “modernizers” and hence drew a new cleavage 
between  “modernizers”  and  “traditionalists”.   Already  the  Schröder-Blair paper showed  this logic  by 
referring to “modern social democrats” which directly implies that there are “non modern” ones, who can 
either adapt or be excluded (Schröder/Blair 1999).  In 2003 this was the fundamental choice of SPD-
adherents:  Either  adapting  to  the  new  language  and  new  concepts  of  SPD-modernizers  overcoming 
“Reformstau”, together with some of those ordo-liberals with similar concepts, or being banished into the 
camp of anachronistic neo-Keynesians who still believe in state intervention and deficit spending. 
As  regards  social actors,  the  discursive  strategy  of  Schröder  government  in  the  context  of  Hartz 
reforms was a strategy of casting-off, not just of potential opposition but of rival belief systems.  The 
result was the formation of two comprehensive advocacy coalitions with a fundamental cleavage that 
suddenly cross-cut the SPD, as Fig. 5 illustrates
73.  The events would not have been possible without the 
discursive background partly inherited partly manipulated by Schröder government through the second 
element of its strategy: the re-framing of discourse.  This realignment of the advocacy coalitions did not 
just concern the policy subsystem actors, it also involved reframing the ideas central to the discourse, as 
the next subsection of the paper illustrates. 
V.4.2   Re-framing the “unwrapped” discourse 
In this second section of discourse analysis we want to lay out the main ideas and common perceptions 
that shaped the discourse around the Hartz reforms and Agenda 2010.  In the following we examine three 
discursive  elements  the  manipulation  of  which  had  political  as  well  as  policy  outcomes:  firstly,  the 
inherited  common  metaphor  of  “Reformstau”,  secondly,  the  dominant  perception  of  the  “inactive 
unemployed” as engaging in “anti social behavior”, and lastly, the concept of personal responsibility. 
Reformstau 
The metaphor of Reformstau has been widely used for German politics (see Streeck and Kitschelt 2003, 
(Dyson 2005: 225).  The perception of a German political and social system blocked by too many veto 
actors constitutes the background of almost any political initiative at least since the famous “Ruck-Rede”, 
the  Berlin  speech  of  former  German  President  Roman  Herzog  who  provoked  great  attention  by  his 
frequently cited demand of a common movement within Germany (Boeckh et al. 2006: 147).  In this 
perception Germany is highly in need of fundamental reforms in order to modernize the welfare state and 
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cooperative  German  political  system,  with  its  joint  decision  traps,  stands  accused  of  not  allowing 
fundamental reforms.  Instead “time stands still” (Merkel 2003: 3).  The “Reformstau” is aggravated by its 
long duration.  The former leader of CDA Arentz stated himself: „Everybody knew about the reform 
needs of Bismarckian welfare system but a substantial remodeling failed to appear.  Mostly just singular 
reform could be implemented” (Arentz 2003).  So, “Reformstau” was not only a problem for the Schröder 
government, it was sometimes seen as the modus operandi of the 1982-1997 Kohl governments.  The first 
Schröder government, until the creation of Hartz Commission, was not seen as the end of “Reformstau”.  
Some political opposition did not even consider the Agenda 2010 a way out of  “Reformstau”: “The 
supposed breakup of reformstau by the red-green government is far from reality“ (Rüttgers 2003: 10, 
Zohlnhöfer 2004).  
The continuity of the blockage argument is quite important for reform proponents because it delivers 
strong reasons for further unpopular means.  Many actors evaluate the Hartz report, the Hartz reforms and 
even the Agenda 2010 just as first steps into the right direction, both political opponents (Fickinger 2002b, 
Heuwagen 2002, Schumacher 2002, Borstel 2003), but also some coalition politicians shared this view: 
“The agenda 2010 is just a first step” (Christa Sager, Green Party, Schuller 2003).  Nonetheless the phase 
around Hartz reforms and Agenda 2010 was widely considered a window of opportunity (Clement 2003: 
19).  Reforms had to be implemented as fast as possible: “Now we have to make fast progress” (Peter 
Hartz, Schumacher/Viering 2002).  
The “Reformstau” metaphor combined with the perception a window of opportunity served to allow 
the  Schröder  government  to  by-pass  constraints  first  by  appointing  an  expert  commission,  then  by 
announcing the Agenda 2010 in a rather declarative or didactic style of a strong executive power having to 
do the right thing without any reasonable alternative.  “Binding hands” is the label that Dyson provides for 
this government style (Dyson 2005).  We rather label it a “governing TINA” (There Is No Alternative).  
Governing TINA is promoted by a dominant advocacy coalition constructing “objective” evidence via 
benchmarking.  Benchmarking processes played a significant role in the manipulation of discourses in the 
context  of  Hartz  reforms  for  example  the  Benchmarking  Committee  of  the  Bertelsmann  Foundation 
(Eichhorst 2001, Eichhorst 2004) or later in Hartz and Agenda debates (Berger 2002, Merkel 2003: 3, 
Stoiber 2003: 6). 
Germany was identified as being near the “bottom” of the table, both by proponents of a special 
reform in order to justify its need and by advocates of even stronger reform in order to criticize the 
insufficiency of proposed reforms.  Germany was mostly evaluated as the “Rote Laterne”, the tail-light: 
“tail-light of European Union” (Merz 2002); “at the bottom of the league concerning economic growth” 
(Berger 2002); “a desolate situation” (Koch 2003).  Although in 2002/03 “Reformstau” as a common 
background perception was not at all new, its intentional, sometimes even manipulative reproduction was 
part of the discursive strategy of reform proponents from all camps, above all the Schröder government. Boyle/Schünemann  The Malleable Politics of Activation Reform  April 2009 
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Unemployment as anti-social behavior 
There are two major theories explaining unemployment: a neoclassical or neoliberal approach and a neo-
Keynesian one (Boeckh et al. 2006: 202-203).  Whilst the latter seeks the reasons for unemployment on 
the demand side, where business does not provide enough jobs so that state government has to invest 
(deficit spending), the neoclassical approach sees the reasons on the supply side.  According to this theory 
labor is either too expensive or the unemployed lack the requisite skills.  Via the development of a low 
wage sector and the enabling means of activation the Hartz reforms thus followed neoclassical thinking.  
But, in addition, the Hartz reforms also introduced mandatory means of activation which rely on a more 
negative  image  of  the  unemployed  as  voluntarily  inactive  persons  not  willing  to  work,  receiving 
unemployment  benefits  and  hence  anti-social  spongers.    We  have  to  analyze  the  related  discursive 
elements to understand the fact that this image could largely prevail and reach wide consensus.  
“The  term  ‘activating  labor  market  policy’  already  defines  the  unemployed  as  passive,  because 
otherwise they could not be ‘activated’ by adequate means“ (Butterwegge et al. 2007).  Butterwegge’s 
observation  is  not  sophistry,  because  it  points  to  a  crucial  paradigmatic  shift  in  the  perception  of 
unemployed.  That this new perception of the unemployed is quite negative can be observed in the preface 
to the Hartz report written by Peter Hartz: “The balance between performance and reward is a universal 
principle; work shall be profitable, not unemployment” (Hartz 2002: 5).  The rejection of “profitable 
unemployment” implicitly contains the paradigm of the voluntarily unemployed abusing state benefits.  
The governmental phrase of “Fördern und Fordern” already introduced with the JobAQTIV law  was 
intentionally  enhanced  to  the  overall  slogan  of  Hartz  report:  “Eigenaktivität  auslösen  –  Sicherheit 
einlösen” (releasing individual activity – redeeming security), which contained the activation claim.  The 
Ministry  for  Economics  and  Labor’s  Hartz-related  publication  presses  ahead  the  attack  against  some 
unemployed: “Those persons having installed themselves on state support without really being needy will 
have to reorient themselves” (BMWA 2005: 12). 
The paradigm of the anti-social unemployed was reproduced by a majority of politicians and other 
social actors all across the political spectrum.  This consensus can be seen as the decisive explanatory 
factor in the  enforceability  of  such  strict  mandatory  means  of  activation.    The  paradigm  of  inactive 
unemployed was strong within the SPD, especially for Gerhard Schröder (Schröder 2003: 14), Wolfgang 
Clement (Clement 2003: 6) and Hartz Commission member Harald Schartau (Frigelj 2002).  The strongest 
attacks  against  “lazy  unemployed”  (Oschmiansky  2003)  traditionally  came  from  CDU  politicians, 
especially the ordo-liberal actors such as Roland Koch (Koch 2003) and Friedrich Merz (Merz 2002) as 
well as others (Germis/Meck 2003, Köhler 2002).  The critique of the Bavarian Prime Minister Edmund 
Stoiber was very global: “Social assistance is a second chance but it cannot be lifestyle” (Stoiber 2003: 
11).  The employer confederation’s president Hundt implied the same when he criticized the widespread 
“early retirement mentality” in Germany (Fickinger 2002a). Boyle/Schünemann  The Malleable Politics of Activation Reform  April 2009 
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The paradigm of the anti-social unemployed was nourished by research coming from economists and 
social scientists as well as from the director of the public employment service, Florian Gerster (Hagelüken 
2002).  The social scientist from WZB Berlin and Hartz Commission member, Günther Schmid, stated: “It 
is  true  that  the  danger  of  false  incentives  grows,  the  longer  unemployment  benefit  is  paid” 
(Hagelüken/Viering 2002). 
But although empirical evidence was prominently cited there were dissenters to this consensual spirit 
within  the  center-left  camp.    The  chairman  of  the  Greens  in  the  Bundestag,  Katrin  Göring-Eckardt, 
opposed the widespread condemnations of unemployed referring to the picture of the “social hammock” 
(Göring-Eckardt 2003: 5).  Another critic within the centeer-left camp came from the SPD opposition in 
Hesse, Andrea Ypsilanti (Riebsamen 2003).  More radical counterpoints came from the PDS: “We think: 
Not unemployed must be fought but unemployment” (PDS 2003) and other, rather excluded actors, such 
as trade union representatives (Viering 2003) and, of course, by the unemployed themselves: “Generally, 
this  distrust  of  Hartz towards  unemployed  bothers  us“  (Schöneberg  2002).    But  despite  these  rather 
sporadic or isolated dissents discourse analysis has shown a predominant consensus about the paradigm of 
“anti  social  unemployment”  prevailed.    This  common  belief  indeed  permitted  the  radical  mandatory 
means of activation contained in Hartz reforms. 
Personal responsibility 
The widespread perception of anti social unemployment and the resulting justification for mandatory 
activation already indicate the path deviant character of the reform debate.  Unemployment had been seen 
since 1927 as a fundamental risk of work-life caused by market failure.  Persons concerned should be 
secured against this risk by obligatory insurance, as similar systems had done for the fundamental risks of 
age,  sickness  or  accident  before.    Neither  the  fact  of  unemployment  nor  the  needed  remedies  were 
considered part of the personal responsibility of the unemployed.  This system-constitutive perception 
changed dramatically with the Hartz and Agenda debates.  The long-term unemployed were seen as (at 
least partly) responsible for their situation.  Given that perception of personal responsibility, the remedy of 
mandatory activation could be justified. 
Indeed, personal responsibility is the key concept underlying both Hartz reforms and Agenda 2010.  It 
is not necessary to go as far as Butterwegge by labeling “Eigenverantwortung” (personal responsibility) as 
the “fighting word of neo-liberalism” (Butterwegge et al. 2007), in order to understand that personal 
responsibility is a key concept of liberal/residual welfare states and is contradictory to the former key 
concept of welfare in Germany: solidarity.  The concept of personal responsibility has replaced solidarity 
at least for one social stratum, the long-term unemployed.  That is the ideological essence of the resulting 
effect: neoliberalism in one class, as illustrated in the empirical analysis presented below about the public 
discourse. Boyle/Schünemann  The Malleable Politics of Activation Reform  April 2009 
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The  Schröder-Blair  paper  from  1999  raised  an  early  social-democratic  “charter  of  personal 
responsibility”:  “Modern  social  democrats  want  to  transform  the  safety  net  of  entitlements  into  a 
springboard to personal responsibility” (Schröder/Blair 1999).  The language of the paper indicates a 
fundamental orientation of “Third Way” or “Neue Mitte” towards liberal welfare state ideology.  Later, in 
2003, personal responsibility is also the key concept of Schröder’s Agenda speech.  Within this speech 
Butterwegge counted 18 appearances of the word (Butterwegge et al. 2007: 169).  We want to give just 
one example: “We will cut state benefits, we will promote personal responsibility and will have to demand 
more individual performance by each person” (Schröder 2003).  The “paradigmatic shift, which privatizes 
risk assumption instead of charging the state with the consequences” (Berger 2002) is not just observed by 
the German doyen of business consultancy, Roland Berger, but posed as a political demand.  Since the 
global claim for personal responsibility was shared by almost all the political opposition (Merkel 2003: 
13, Rüttgers 2003: 13, Germis/Meck 2003) it was highly consensual as common belief or conception for 
policy  change. In  order to  make  it  less  controversial the concept  of  personal responsibility  has  been 
combined or reconciled with other key concepts of welfare state, as well as with the Catholic social 
thought  tradition.    So,  sometimes  subsidiarity  was  chosen  as  more  consensual  word  for  personal 
responsibility (Rüttgers 2003: 9) or personal responsibility was even brought together with solidarity: 
“Solidarity is always a two way street” (Merz 2002).  This discursive argument won the support of the 
Catholic  bishops  who  published  a  paper  called  “Solidarity  needs  personal  responsibility” 
(Bischofskonferenz 2003, Arentz 2003).  Furthermore the “Help for self help”-idea (Hartz 2002: 97, Koch 
2003: 33) in its context of international developmental politics, was transferred to the debate. 
The path deviant alteration of the German welfare system by Hartz and Agenda 2010 reforms is 
already announced in the discursive characterization of personal responsibility.  The role of the welfare 
state should obviously be redefined into a more residual one, as with liberal market economies.  State 
benefits  should  concentrate  on  fundamental  need  whereas  all  the  other  security  demands  should  be 
covered by individuals themselves: “It is thus necessary to concentrate on the fundamental social benefits, 
whereas additional benefits are subject to individual care” (Berger 2002).  CDU opposition leader Angela 
Merkel  stated:  “We  have  to  trust the  people  and  make  state’s  retreat  possible”  (Merkel  2003:  12) a 
paradigmatically dominant view that was clearly shared by FDP leader Guido Westerwelle as well as SPD 
minister for economy and labor Wolfgang Clement (Westerwelle 2003: 1, Jacobi/Schäfer 2003). 
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V.4.3 A common narrative for a new advocacy coalition 
The  special  radicalism  of  the  Hartz  reforms  and  the  question  how  such  radical  reforms  could  be 
implemented in a coordinated social market economy such as Germany’s cannot be answered without 
referring to the results of this discourse analysis.  The first part of the discursive strategy analyzed, the 
exclusion of speakers or de-legitimization of speaker positions resulted in a realignment of advocacy 
coalitions, the finally winning coalition containing social democratic modernizers as well as center-right 
ordo-liberals.    The  second  part  of  the  discourse  strategy  involved  the  construction  of  new  system-
constitutive perceptions, a new narrative for labor market and welfare state reform in Germany.  This 
common story line revolved around the three concepts of Reformstau, anti social unemployment, and 
personal responsibility (or privatizing the risk assumption) and can be summarized as follows: 
Germany had long suffered from a politico-economic blockage for reforms, a “Reformstau”, caused 
by too many actors engaged in decision-making and policy formation processes.  Trade unions were seen 
as structural conservative actors avoiding an adequate reaction to the factual constraints emerging from 
globalization as well as Europeanization.  Since Germany – situated at the very bottom of the league – 
needed to quickly adapt to the exigencies of market competition the welfare state has to be reformed as 
fast as possible.  As regards the labor market the neo-classical assumption is right and the reasons for 
unemployment can be found on the supply side.  Labor in Germany is too expensive and the unemployed 
often do not have the skills demanded by industry.  Since many unemployed are inactive or not active 
enough, they have to be activated through enabling means but also and above all through strict mandatory 
activation.  The state has to reduce benefits and overall intervention, it has to rethink itself in terms of its 
core responsibility of delivering just residual assistance for those who cannot help themselves.  Many of 
the other social tasks the state has been charged with have to be seen as the personal responsibility of 
those affected.  These should be the guidelines for the modernization of the welfare state that must be 
implemented first for labor market, then also for health care and pension systems. 
 
When we look at the German welfare state today we see that although there have been less remarkable 
reforms  in  the  other  sectors  too,  the  most  radical  reforms  according  to  the  narrative  have  been 
implemented at the bottom end of the labor market (but not further than that – the major features of the 
coordinated market economy and its Bismarckian supports are largely intact for those not in this section of 
the  labor  market  (Hall  and  Soskice,  2009).    The  necessary  ensilaged  coordinative  and  didactic 
communicative discourses were only possible in that sector because the persons concerned are largely 
excluded from policy formation and, unlike the Irish case, elected politicians did not fear a backlash.  So, 
in the end, the result of Hartz and Agenda reforms can be described as neo-liberalism in one class.  
The Hartz reforms compared to the other cases selected can be seen as radical path deviant labor 
market  policy  change.  As  we  have  pointed  out  the  special  radicalism  of  Hartz  legislation  lay  in  its 
mandatory means of activation. In order to implement such a policy the Schröder government had to 
choose new types of policy formation and legimation. Instead of following traditional procedural and 
discursive  processes  it  applied  an  innovative  dyadic  discursive  strategy.  The  advocacy  coalition 
framework  combined  with  discourse  analysis  explained  this  new  governmental  style  which  excluded 
speakers (government-by-commission), de-legitimized speaker positions (e.g. union representatives and Boyle/Schünemann  The Malleable Politics of Activation Reform  April 2009 
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SPD “traditionalists), and constructed knowledge or re-framed fundamental ideas (“Reformstau”, “anti-
social  unemployed”  and  “personal  responsibility”).  So  from  both  perspectives  included  within  the 
theoretical framework, the actor- or coalition centered perspective (s. as “result” fig. 5 showing advocacy 
coalitions for the German case) and the more ideational one (s. as quasi-summary the common narrative or 
storyline in part V.4.3), discourse analysis could elucidate the special discursive ground on which the 
Hartz reforms were possible. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper has developed new analytic vocabulary and analytic instruments.  Applying this vocabulary 
and these instruments to all cases in the 4-field matrix (s.fig. 1) there are two examples of path dependent 
(Britain  and  the  Netherlands)  and  two  examples  of  path  deviant  reforms  (Germany  and  Ireland). As 
regards political outcome there are different pairs for enabling activation reform (the Netherlands and 
Ireland)  and  mandatory  activation  reform  (Britain  and  Germany)  respectively.  In  contrast  to  the 
widespread convergence assumptions for European welfare states our comparative study shows that policy 
outcomes are quite different, and indeed, discourse matters for labor market reforms. Where coordinative 
discourse is reflexive or deliberative and communicative discourse attenuated or even populist/clientelist, 
as in the Netherlands and Ireland, center-left governments cannot implement labor market reforms with 
mandatory  activation  means.  But  where  coordinative  discourse  is  ensilaged  and  the  communicative 
discourse declarative or didactic, as is traditionally the case in Britain and was exceptionally the case in 
Germany,  center-left  governments  can  implement  mandatory  activation  policies.  In  both  path-deviant 
cases (Germany and Ireland) strong and enduring advocacy coalitions grew out of the FÁS and Hartz 
vehicles. 
Figure 6. Summary Table 
  Netherlands  Britain  Ireland  Germany 
Welfare State Type  Bismarckian  Liberal  Liberal  Bismarckian 
Political Economy 
Type 
Coordinated 
Market Economy 
Liberal Market 
Economy 
Liberal Market 
Economy 
Coordinated market 
Economy 
Unemployment 
Rate 
12% (1992)  10% (1997)  19% (1994)  12% (2004) 
Paradigmatic 
Document 
1990 WRR report  1996 “New Deal 
for..” 
1985 NESC report  2002 Bertelsmann 
Positionspapier 
Reform Window  1992-6  1997-2000  1992-1995  2002-2005 
Key Policy 
Entrepreneurs 
Kok.   
Lubbers 
Brown 
Blair 
Quinn 
Ahern 
Shröder 
Hartz 
Governing Parties  CD-PvdA,  
PvdA-CD,  
Labour  Fianna Fail-Labour 
Fine Gael-Labour-DL 
Red-Green 
Comparative Model  Scandinavian  USA  Scandinavian  British 
Winning Advocacy 
Coalition  
Polder social 
partnership 
New Labour  FÁS-based  Hartz-based 
Other Coalitions  Neo-liberal 
Neo-Keynesian 
Rhenish  Neo-Keynesian 
Irish Blairites 
Alliance for Jobs 
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Neo-Keynesians 
Deliberative 
Mechanism 
Party-centered  Hijacked Labour 
Party 
FÁS (Government by 
commission) 
Hartz (Government 
by Commission) 
Coordinating (elite) 
Discourse 
Deliberative 
Governance 
Ensilaged  Deliberative 
Governance 
Ensilaged 
Communicative 
Discourse 
Attenuated  Didactic  Populist  Adversarial 
Policy Outcome  Enabled 
Activation 
Mandatory 
Activation 
Activation without 
Conditionality 
Neo-liberalism in 
one class 
Political Outcome  Radical path 
dependent reform 
Radical path-
dependent reform 
Radical, path deviant 
reform 
Radical path-
deviant reform 
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Endnotes 
                                                           
1 Or maybe a deeper regression to type after 2007, to the land of weeping effigies. 
2 Visser (1997), Schludi (2001)  
3 These dates are of actual policy initiatives, they flow out of earlier paradigmatic documents – a 1990 WRR document in the 
Netherlands, the 1996 document “New Deal for a lost generation in Britain, the 1985 NESC report for Ireland and a 2002 
Bertelsmann Positionspapier for Germany - the earlier stage is the coordinative discourse, the latter is the communicative one.   
4 Boyle (2005) is based on 47 elite-level interviews conducted in 2003-4. 
5 “Clientelism“ is a term almost universally used pejoratively, Boyle (2005) argues it can be both a form of social capital and an 
effective communicative discourse. 
6 The argument here builds on Dyson’s (2005) that government by commission provided a method of accomplishing change 
analogous to change through Europeanization (both hand-tying) elsewhere.   
7 Often referred to as social democrats. 
8 The Rehn-Meidner model. 
9 “Competition state”
9 ideas are at odds with both traditional free-market (or ordo-liberal) and social democratic (or neo-
Keynesian) paradigms.  However, the “competition state” spectrum itself is broad.   
10 In particular, there is no assumption about a fiscal divided and thus policy activism need to be cost-neutral, with any 
“activating” expenditures coming out of “passive” budget savings. 
11 Participation is viewed as the only means to avoid social exclusion, opting out of the waged labor market is viewed as deviant.  
This poses a normative – challenge to conservative (familial, welfare without work) social democratic (decommodifying, market 
over need),and liberal (voluntarist) welfare state values . 
12 Positive activation identified normatively as “freedom to act” in contrast to the “freedom from want” of the KWS- 
13 For a good discussion of the two dimensions of activation see W. Eichhorst and R Konle-Seidle (2008) Contingent 
Convergence: A Comparative Analysis of Activation Policies (IZA Discussion Paper No. 3905, December 2008.  They use 
“demanding” and “enabling” as labels, we prefer mandatory instead of demanding, but the German Fordern is perhaps better still. 
14 J. Torfing (1999) “Workfare with Welfare: recent reforms of the Danish welfare state Journal of European Social Policy Vol. 9. 
No. 1, 
15 Requiring the unemployed to accept whatever job or placement offers are made, on pain of benefit loss. Boyle/Schünemann  The Malleable Politics of Activation Reform  April 2009 
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16 As occurred with some social democrats (Sweden) and free-marketeers (Thatcherites) in the 1980’s regarding active labor 
market policy..  The advocacy coalition approach is especially useful in capturing the distinction between “core beliefs” and 
secondary ones.  There is considerable fluidity around secondary beliefs, but the not primary ones.  
17 A formulation borrowed from Peter Hall Governing the Economy (1986) p. 18. 
18 Our term, not Schmidt’s.  The analogy from agriculture is that “ensilaged” policy reform seals it off from elements 
(oxygen=widespread debate) that would rot it at an early stage.  Ensilaging preserves the product but it also chemically alters it:  
“pickled” rather than fresh or dried.  The authors have roots in Schleswig cow country and Connaught sheep country respectively, 
please excuse the agricultural analogy.  
19The advocacy coalition framework is defined by Sabatier and Pelkey as follows: “Advocacy coalitions are composed of elite 
actors from a variety of institutions - interest groups, agency officials, legislators, executive overseers, intellectuals -who share 
a general set of normative and causal beliefs concerning the policy area” (1987: 237). 
20 “Thus policy learning cannot be viewed as a politically neutral exercise for improving policy making.” (Fleckenstein: 182).  
21 “We all know that there is no prospect of getting unemployment down to acceptable levels within the next few years 
(consequently) we must show that we have some political imagination, that we are willing to salvage something – albeit second 
best – from the sheer waste involved”.  (Prime Minister’s Central Policy Review Staff, February 1981 report).  
22 This spending came close to rivaling that on “passive” unemployment and welfare programs, and was high in comparative 
perspective.  ALMP 1979-90 was the most spectacular, and counter-intuitive, aspect of Thatcherite labor market policy.   
23 The MSC was the national labor market agency, a social partnership organization.  Continental European models, particularly 
the West German Vocational Education and Training model were especially admired by the MSC.  The term “Rhenish” was 
usually applied to this because (a) it was a preferred euphemism for “German” and (b) it alluded to features of the political 
economies of the original EEC 6.   
24. The MSC’s “house philosophy” was based on an analysis that saw Britain’s relative economic decline as being rooted in a 
flawed social ethic, a cultural constraint on economic modernization: a constraint that had to be challenged. The key actors 
involved in the development of MSC ideas and programs shared these views.  Geoffrey Holland was an early planner of the 
Training Services Agency and he subsequently became director of the MSC and, after its abolition, permanent secretary at the 
Department of Employment  
25.  We will now guarantee a place on the YTS to every school leaver under 18 who is not going directly into a job... We will take 
steps to ensure that those under 18 who deliberately choose to remain unemployed are not eligible for benefit……We will 
improve the Community Programme [the main program focused on the long term unemployed] to make it full time and better able 
to help those with families.  We shall pay those working on the programme an allowance giving a premium over and above their 
social security payments”.  Conservative Party Manifesto, 1987 “The Next Moves Forward”. 
26.  It's perceived success (stressed by both Young The Enterprise Years p. 174 and Fowler Ministers Decide p. 187) did much to 
set the terms of the debate over the extent of work-shyness on the part of the unemployed and the need for further coercion into 
the labor market, 
27 Marginalizing the neo-Keynesians in active labor market policy, even during the brief neo-Keynesian ascendency in macro 
economic policy 1980-83 under Michael Foot. 
28Crisply summarized in the 1997 manifesto:  “New Labour is a party if ideas and ideals but not of outdated ideology…we have 
liberated these values from outdated dogma or doctrine, and we have applied these values to the modern world.  I want a country 
in which people get on, do well, make a success of their lives….We will give under-25’s opportunities for work, education and 
training.  Four options will be on offer.  Rights and responsibilities must go hand in hand, without a fifth option of life on full 
benefit”.  1997 Labour Party Manifesto Britain will be better with New Labour.  
29 Interview with Richard Warner, General Manager, Demos Institute, July 18,1999 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ed Balls, the special adviser to Gordon Brown who was most intimately involved in creating New Deal, studied under Larry 
Summers (Secretary of the Treasury) and Lawrence Katz, (who served under Robert Reich in the Department of Labor), whilst at 
Harvard.  They co-authored a paper that analyzed British unemployment by region and skill and concluded that long term 
unemployment was largely the result of “skill mismatches and a loss of the culture of work…”. Ed Balls points out that both the 
Clinton and Blair governments’ welfare reform strategies have been forged in accordance with this basic logic. Interview with Ed 
Balls, Special Adviser to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, HM Treasury, November 18, 1998.    
33 Such as then US Deputy Treasury Secretary Larry Summers and Hilary Clinton. 
34 Interview With Bill Wells, DFEE, July 26, 1999 
35Interview with Luke Bruce, The Labour Party Policy Unit, Milbank Tower, July 21, 1999. 
36 Interview With Andrew Maugham, Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for Social Security, July 27, 1999. 
37 Interview with Andrew Kilpatrick, Head of Macroeconomic and Fiscal Policy, HM Treasury, November 16, 1998. 
38 “New Deal Special Report”, New Statesman April 3 (1998) 52-58. 
39 Jobs for the Boys and Girls, New Statesman, February 13, 1998, pp22-23. Interview With Bill Wells, DFEE, July 26, 1999.  
The result is a complex pattern of arrangements in each of the 136 Education Service districts. It is important to emphasize that 
each district possesses its own unique institutional arrangements that involve various public-private partnerships.  This is viewed a 
critical for ensuring the flexibility required to respond to regional needs Boyle/Schünemann  The Malleable Politics of Activation Reform  April 2009 
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40 The private papers of Charles Haughey, who as Taoiseach 1987-92 oversaw the introduction of social partnership, credit 
Schmidt with convincing Haughey at a 1982European summit meeting, that German-style social partnership was a better model.  
Irish Independent February 4
th, 1987.   
41 The color coding is derived from the neo-liberal “Golden Straitjacket” identified by Thomas Friedman (The Lexus and the 
Olive Tree, New York, Anchor Press, 2000) and the black of European Christian Democracy (clerical by origin), the ideological 
underpinning concepts of social partnership and subsidiarity. 
42 Introduced by Minister for Labour (Taoiseach 1997-2007) Bertie Ahern, (building on the work of  his predecessor Ruairi Quinn 
(a leading Labour politician) who drafted the September 1986 White Paper on Manpower Policy. 
43 Interview with John Lynch, FAS Chairman 1988-91 and FAS Director General 1991-2000, 1-15-02. Labour Minister Ruairi 
Quinn also cites Sweden as inspiration (interview, 2004).   
44 Boyle 2005 was based on 47 elite-level interviews conducted in 2003-4. 
45 Dermot McCarthy is the godfather of social partnership.  As director of the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) 
played an important role in its initial formation and since 1993 as Assistant Secretary General in the Department of the Taoiseach 
and since 2000 as Secretary General to the Government, and the Department of the Taoiseach he has been the Irish giovernment’s 
key interlocutor with the social partners. 
46 Economist, February 27, 1988, p. 41. Delors 1 channeled IR£3.1billion to Ireland, one third of it through FAS.  Delors 2 
channeled IR£4.6 billion into Ireland.  Over one third of this went through FÁS.  At a broader level, the European Commission as 
an important actor in Irish ALMP reinforced the concept of social partnership and highlighted European models (both Social and 
Christian Democratic) for Ireland..  Irish state institutions are usually caught between the rock of powerful, centralized state 
(especially the Finance Ministry) and the hard place of a party system highly responsive to local political pressure.   In the case of 
FÁS, European money and the ability of Finance to calculate the net cost of programs gave FÁS leverage with Finance that 
sustained support for FÁS programs even in times of extreme fiscal austerity.   The breadth of local support for FÁS programs 
provided further political insulation that extended across party political boundaries. The regionalization of FÁS furthered its 
ability to nurture and mobilize alliances with local community groups. 
47 One principal actor recalled, “I remember going to a National Consultative Committee meeting, which monitored progress on 
the partnership programme, and being asked if we could increase the Social Employment Scheme (later, the Community 
Employment Scheme). To the horror of our parent civil service Department, I said that we could double it to over 30,000 
participants (representing nearly 3 percent of the labour market). We were subsequently asked to double it. This would not have 
occurred in the normal liaison between FAS and its parent Department”.  Correspondence with Henry Murdoch, Assistant 
Director General of FAS 1987-99.  
48 OECD (2003),  Employment Outlook (OECD; Paris 2003). Of those 1.8 million native Irish  in employment in 2004 well over 
half have participated in FÁS training and/or employment programs Between 1987 and 2001 FÁS throughput on its training and 
employment schemes averaged about 100,000 per year (FÁS annual reports 1987-2001).  MacSharry and White note that 500,000 
participated in EU supported training 1989-93, though they characteristically omit to mention that all of this operated through 
FÁS (Mac Sharry and White, 2000, 156). The bulk of the job growth has been in sectors that have drawn heavily on FÁS 
programs and trainees, especially in the 2002-2007 construction boom. 70% of the job growth has been concentrated in five 
sectors: construction; sales; hospitality; transport and communication; and financial.  These figures are for the 1994-2000 period, 
Quarterly National Household Survey, November 2000.  All of these sectors recorded growth of more than 30%.   
49 The two most important actors in active labor market policy in Ireland were Bertie Ahern from the left wing of Fianna Fail and 
Ruari Quinn from the trade union wing of Labour.  One or other served as either Employment Minister of Finance Minister for the 
1983-97 period, 1992-1994represented the apogee of this axis with Ahern at Finance and Quinn at Employment.. 
50 Headed by Julie O’Neill (in Tanaiste Spring’s office).  An interdepartmental committee also at work on this.  The Taskforce 
report came out in Feb 1995.  
51 Interview with Dr John Lynch, FAS Chairman 1988-91 and FAS Director General 1991-2000, 1-15-02. 
52 All political parties are clientelistic and localistic in their orientation, the electoral system making them hyper-responsive to 
their constituents, especially unemployed constituents, Ireland being unusual in having higher voter turnout among poor voters 
than among wealthy ones 
53 Regarding commutative discourse and Irish politics, the lack of a conventional left-right spectrum is unusual.  Fianna Fail, the 
dominant party in the Irish political system defies easy classification.  It identifies itself as center left (especially Ahern), and 
some scholars agree with the (O’Donnell 2008: 88).  Populist with a markedly progressive wing would be a better description, a 
progressive wing that has always sought to cultivate cooperation with unions.   
54 Bruton and his officials crafted the 1997 Human Resource Development White Paper that drew on three distinct sources of 
criticism of FÁS: expert and/or consultant opinion on the effectiveness of FÁS programs; criticism of FÁS from employers; and 
criticism of FÁS’s independence from Departmental control.  
55 The political strategy of casting a “progressive” agenda as equidistant from the new right and the old social democratic left. 
56 In the area of active labor market policy this involved both an emphasis on the “duties” of benefit recipients and an 
“individualized” approach to addressing skill needs. 
57 It was not, however, a backdoor route to workfare.  The paradigm represented a modified and heavily coded form of Irish neo-
liberalism :a “new economy” approach that viewed training as a vehicle through which Irish firms could become more strategic, 
“thinking organizations”  
58 Irish clientelism is a self-abasing sort, according to Collins and O’Shea (2003) in which clients view patrons as being beholden 
to them, not vice versa.  Boyle/Schünemann  The Malleable Politics of Activation Reform  April 2009 
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59 Boyle (2005) dubbed FAS the Swiss Army Knife of the Irish stare – Swiss army knives being noted for performing myriad 
functions, none of them well, but that they perform so many is what is valuable.  Participation on CE peaked at 5% of the 
workforce in the mid 1990’s, averaged 3% in the late 1990’s and fell to 1% of the workforce  for 2000-2008 (OECD, 2009:136).  
60 This was to be put to the test again by (a) the disappearance of mass unemployment and (b) the tenure of Mary Harney as 
Minister responsible for employment policy 1997-2004.  With the end of mass unemployment was not FÁS’s raison d’être gone?  
And not only did CE did not wither away in fact, relative to the number of long-term unemployed, it remained as large a program 
as ever, and was increasingly asked to address an even larger array of policy problems.   
61 As of 2009 the Department of Social and Family Affairs had created an “Activation Programme” but it lacked any participation 
requirements, there has also been a crackdown on outright fraud 
62 This CDU slogan of the election campaign in 1957 (Adenauer was Chancellor) seems to fit also to Kohl’s strategy. 
6363 A famous title of the German political magazine showed the country as a strangulated tree, Der Spiegel (39) 2002 
(21.09.2002). 
64 The CDU had close ties to unions as well as SPD politicians to business.  (CDU ￿ CDA; SPD ￿ AFA and Trade Union 
Council) 
65 Hartz III entered into force in January 2004 and effected a structural remodeling of the former Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (public 
employment service) into the new Bundesagentur für Arbeit (public employment agency).  
66 In fact this alteration was not part of the fourth law for modern services on labor market but of a fifth law approved the same 
day. 
67 Given this fact the social protests against the reform coming up in 2004 cannot really surprise. 
68 Translation by the German government, s. NAP 2003-2005. 
69 The Federal Audit Court checked the placement statistics of 5 employment offices with the scandalous result that over 70% of 
booked placements were wrongly booked (Handelsblatt vom 6.2.2002). 
70 There are various factors for Schröder’s victory, the Hartz Commission certainly does not serve for monocausal explanation. 
71 In analogy to the famous revolutionary movement in the DDR in 1989. 
72 Constitution as party not before 2005. 
73 We can also deliver a first and very basic explanation for the development of a new political party in the following years, Die 
Linke. 